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Abstract: This paper will focus on Stalin’s use of Soviet space throughout the 1930s and 
the relationship this had with the developing Stalin cult. In the thirties, Stalin had 
consolidated power and from as early as 1929 the Stalin cult was beginning to emerge. 
However, the cult was more than merely an embodiment of the state’s totalitarian nature. It 
was built on, and sustained by, a complex metanarrative which drew heavily on ritual, 
mythology and history. By looking at the relationship between the development of the Stalin 
cult and development of this spatial metanarrative, this paper will focus on the production 
and projection of the cult onto the Soviet topos, creating what Eric Naiman has termed a 
“virtual landscape”. In this transient topography Stalin’s cultivation of spatial mythology 
was essential in the configuration and authentication of the cult.  The Stalin cult of the thirties 
defined, and was in turn itself defined, by two main spaces: Moscow and the Arctic (centre 
and periphery). By deconstructing the spatial metanarrative attached to these two spaces, 
this paper will analyse how Stalin used space to facilitate a mental environment that 
expedited the development of his cult.    
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Introduction 
The plot of Lev Kuleshov’s 1941 children’s film The Siberians is relatively simple: two 
boys and one girl from the peripheral settlement of Turukhanskii, the place where Stalin 
escaped exile, dream of going to Moscow to meet him. To fulfil this dream they must 
undertake a rather peculiar mission. On Christmas Eve, an old hunter tells the children the 
remarkable story of Stalin’s escape, a feat whereby he overcame the perilous topography of 
Mother Russia. The hunter also tells them that during his escape from exile Stalin lost his 
pipe. Learning this the two boys decide to track down the pipe and deliver it to Moscow, 
setting the scene for their rite of passage. However, in a magical dream it is the girl rather 
than the boys who first communicates with Stalin. As the narrative goes on, dream and reality 
converge; after meeting with the two boys Stalin becomes conscious of the girl’s ‘reality’. 
On their return the boys are standing underneath a portrait of Stalin, telling the girl of their 
meeting when Stalin’s hand extends from the painting inviting the girl to Moscow.  Thus, as 
the film comes to an end the children’s lives have metamorphosed into a realised dream. The 
Siberians, as with most of the Stalinist cultural products, was a repository of state myth. 
Thematically composed to the tune of the Kremlin, Kuleshov’s 1941 film followed the 
prototypical plot of cultural Stalinism, depositing its two key tenets: juxtaposed space 
(centre/periphery) and rite of passage.1 In the film the children are innately drawn towards 
the apex of Soviet space, Moscow. In their real and surreal voyages across the Soviet 
topography the children undergo an ideological rite of passage by seeking proximity to Stalin. 
This narrative schema combined with the effacement of reality characterises the 1930s 
representation of the Stalinist landscape. 
Kuleshov’s film was one of many ‘cult products’, these products did not arise ex nihilo. 
Behind these products, whether they be a portrait, play, film or song, were the people and 
institutions that carefully crafted the cultic metanarrative: as Clifford Geertz wrote, “majesty 
is made, not born”.2 There was a plethora of cult products, each of which can be periodically 
associated with different temporal manifestations of the Stalin cult. This paper will focus on 
the 1930s and the relationship between the development of the Stalin cult and development 
of a spatial metanarrative, the scope of which will focus on the production and projection of 
the cult onto the Soviet topos, creating what Eric Naiman has termed a “virtual landscape”.3 
                                                                                                                          
1  Lev  Kuleshov,  The  Siberians,  1941.  
2  Clifford  Geertz,  Local  Knowledge:  Further  Essays  In  Interpretive  Anthropology  (New  York:  Basic,  1983),  124.  
3  Evgeny  Dobrenko  and  Eric  Naiman,  ed,  The  Landscape  of  Stalinism:  The  Art  and  Ideology  of  Soviet  Space  
(London:  University  of  Washington  Press,  2003),  xii.  
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In this transient topography, Stalin’s cultivation of spatial mythology was essential in the 
configuration and authentication of the cult. The spatial poetics of the cult were hinged 
between the juxtaposed paradigm of centre and periphery. This dialectic tension was used to 
sacralise the Soviet topography through the condensation of time and space into a singular 
point – Moscow. At the apex of this singular point was Stalin - the purveyor of Soviet space 
– around whom a narrative of proximity was formed. This paper will analyse the creation of 
this sacred space and the concomitant narratives of passage that were attached to it, arguing 
that these played a key role in the facilitation of the Stalin cult. 
 
Literature Review  
On 21 December 1929, Joseph  Vissarionovich Stalin turned fifty years old. Often cited 
as a keystone moment in the annals of Stalinism, his fiftieth birthday saw the inauguration 
of the Stalin cult. Over the next 23 years, the ubiquity of the cult would come to dominate 
the mental universe of the Soviet Union.4 Since the cults inception, it has been used as one 
of the foremost pieces of evidence to condemn the depravity of Stalinism. Historians such a 
Norman Naimark and Robert Conquest have approached the cult somewhat monolithically 
seeing it mainly as a manifestation of the Terror.  In this light the Stalin cult has come to 
embody the Soviet Union’s totalitarian legacy. 5  However, this perspective has been 
symptomatic of the disjuncture between the description and analysis of the cult, with the 
historical narrative using the cult to describe the structural violence of Stalinism without 
necessarily analysing it.6  Whilst I do not look to detract from the viewpoint of the cult as an 
oppressive tool of totalitarianism, I do strive to explore the cult through a different optic. 
Revisionists such as Shelia Fitzpatrick have broadened the lens of the study looking both 
inside and outside the terror for answers. In her seminal work, Cultural Revolution in Russia, 
Fitzpatrick along with other contributors such as Moshe Lewin and Gail Lapidus break down 
the basic dichotomy between state and society which is found in the general totalitarian 
model. In trying to paint a portrait of the emerging new social species, Homo Sovieticus, 
Fitzpatrick gives us daily Stalinism in facto. She argues that the “Cultural Revolution” of 
the Soviet society in the early 1930s was a process that although took directive from central 
authority, was also self-sustaining.7 The result of which was a wider look at the role of the 
                                                                                                                          
4  Jan  Plamper,  The  Stalin  Cult:  A  Study  in  the  Alchemy  of  Power  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  
2012),  1.  
5  See  Robert  Conquest,  The  Great  Terror:  A  Reassessment  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1990);  
Norman  Naimark,  Stalin’s  Genocide  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2010).  
6  Plamper,  The  Stalin  Cult,  1.  
7  Shelia  Fitzpatrick,  Cultural  Revolution  in  Russia  (Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1978).    
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Stalinist mythology in the formation of social identity.8 This historiographical shift away 
from the wholly totalitarian narrative was a revision that unveiled a much more complex 
relationship between state and society. Many revisionists since have used this foundation to 
argue that one of the crowning accomplishments of the state was the creation of social 
structures that consolidated and sustained the emerging system.9  For example, works such 
as Jochen Hellbeck’s Revolution on My Mind, use diaries of Soviet citizen to demonstrate 
how Stalinism actively shaped their social identities.10 In works like Hellbeck’s, it is possible 
to see how individual citizens absorbed the directives of Stalinism and actively attempted to 
recreate themselves, thus conveying just how complex the relationship between the society 
and state actually was. 
 Where the historiography has gone on to analyse the cult, there has been a rich and 
probing analysis. Historians such as Katerina Clark, and more recently Jan Plamper have 
looked to analyse the cultural production of the Stalin cult. These works have been 
invaluable in pushing for a new comprehensive understanding in this area of study, focusing 
on the cult’s genesis, functions, products and more recently production. By deconstructing 
the aesthetic and semantic elements of the cult, Clark and Plamper explore the cult’s complex 
metanarrative which dominated the Soviet cultural sphere.11 The majority of this scholarship 
focuses almost exclusively on the art and ideology of Soviet Space in the 1930s, a period 
that saw Stalin and particularly Moscow in the zenith of time.12 Crucially, the 1930s bore 
one of the key cultural facilitators of the Stalin cult, socialist realism, a stylistic movement 
which would come to assign hierarchy and meaning to both real and imagined Soviet space.  
However, not until recently has Western historiography looked to seriously engage with 
socialist realism as a means of understanding the Stalin cult. As Katerina Clark pointed out 
in the preface of her milestone work, The Soviet Novel: Ritual as History: “Soviet Socialist 
Realism is virtually a taboo topic in the Western Slavic scholarship”.13 She argues that the 
reason for such derision is a collective judgement that is again more preoccupied with 
                                                                                                                          
8  See  Sheila  Fitzpatrick,  Everyday  Stalinism:  Ordinary  Life  in  Extraordinary  Times:  Soviet  Russia  in  the  1930s  
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000).        
9  See  Stephen  Kotin,  Magnetic  Mountain:  Stalinism  as  Civilization  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  
1995);  Graeme  Gill,  Symbols  and  Legitimacy  in  Soviet  Politics  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  
2011);  Katerina  Clark,  Moscow,  the  Fourth  Rome:  Stalinism,  Cosmopolitanism,  and  the  Evolution  of  Soviet  
Culture,  1931-­‐1941  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  2011).  
10  See  Jochen  Hellbeck,  Revolution  on  My  Mind:  Writing  a  Diary  Under  Stalin  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  
University  Press,  2006).    
11  See  Plamper,  The  Stalin  Cult;  Katerina,  Clark,  Petersburg:  Crucible  of  Cultural  Revolution  (Cambridge:  
Harvard  University  Press,  1995);  idem,  The  Soviet  Novel:  History  as  Ritual  (Bloomington:  Indiana  University  
Press,  1981).  
12  Karl,  Schlögel,  Moscow  1937  (Cambridge:  Polity,  2012),  45.  
13  Clark,  The  Soviet  Novel,  ix.  
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description rather than evaluation, with socialist realism being virtually self-evident. In the 
academic world most socialist realist works are felt to be intellectually suspect, political 
revolution leading to cultural devolution.14 This has unsurprisingly resulted in very few 
Western works on what was one of the mainstream cultural movements of Soviet Union. 
Instead, Western scholarship has focused more on works from the dissident fringes. Clark’s 
work has been instrumental in readjusting the optic through which we look socialist realism, 
rather than try to compare the likes of Ostrovskii to Dickens, the historian should adopt a 
methodology that evaluates the works in their institutional context. In doing so, Clark looked 
at it as a repository of state myth and argued that it was one of the key proponents of a 
cultural landscape that aimed to blur the lines between reality and fiction. 
Following on from this there has been an increasing number of academics from many 
disciplines who have used socialist realism as a vessel into the 1930s. Evgeny Dobrenko and 
Eric Naiman’s work The Landscape of Stalinism is a key example of how far the study of 
cultural Stalinism has come. From backgrounds of history, art, literary studies, and 
philosophy, the contributors give a wide-ranging analysis of the relationship between 
Stalinism, space and culture. Primarily concerned with production rather than the 
consumption of the Stalinist ideology, the volume of essays seeks to conceptualise the spatial 
dimension of cultural Stalinism, and in parts the Stalin cult. As Eric Naiman describes, the 
volume “deals with the ideology’s attempt to climb into another dimension”.15 In many cases 
the contributors look to exhibit this in various ways using different methodological and 
stylistic devices, however, they share a thematic arch focusing on the semanticisation and 
saturation of space with meaning. Stalinist space is a battleground; Boris Groys in his chapter 
speaks of the struggle for the “symbolic occupation” of time and space.16  A key aspect of 
this battle was the sacralisation of space, a theme innovated by Katerina Clark this looks at 
just how crucial the cultural sphere was as a medium for coding space with the profane – a 
key theme of the Stalin cult.  
One of the most interesting areas that this notion is explored in is Soviet cinema. Experts 
in this field such as Oksana Bulgakowa and Emma Widdis have both honed in on the 1930’s 
as the time when the potential of the film’s capacity to produce a mass narrative was realised. 
Cinema, Lenin said, was the “most important of all the arts” – a visionary new means of 
communicating with an illiterate populace.17  The film industry is perhaps best where we see 
                                                                                                                          
14  Ibid.  
15  Evgeny  Dobrenko  and  Eric  Naiman,  ed,  The  Landscape  of  Stalinism,  xiii.  
16  Boris  Groys,  “The  Art  of  Totality”  in  Ibid,  97.  
17  Emma  Widdis,  Visions  of  a  New  Land:  Soviet  Film  from  Revolution  to  the  Second  World  War  (New  Haven,  
Conn:  Yale  University  Press,  2003),  13.  
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the juncture between art and politics: directors’ discretion was subject to the state. Widdis 
argues that out of all the vast machinery in the Soviet cultural system, film was where one 
can see the new ideas of Soviet space “projected onto the vast, shared screen of popular 
imagination”.18 Stalin and the Bolsheviks enlisted modern technology in their attempt to 
create a new space and a new idea of Sovietness. The emerging Soviet identity was tied up 
in the complex cultural mythology of space – a space which was gravitated around the holy 
trinity of Stalin, the Kremlin and Moscow. Widdis, much like Clark, stresses that the real 
and imagined notions of Soviet territory that coexisted in the cultural field were by no means 
merely just centrally produced propaganda.19 What is important when understanding the 
achievements of the Soviet propaganda machine “is to appreciate the creative power of the 
cultural imagery and the extent to which visions of utopia were a real, creative force in the 
construction of society”.20    
Following on from the recent multidisciplinary approaches to the cultural study of 1930s, 
this work will look hone in on the cultural narrative and its specific relationship with the 
facilitation and consolidation of the Stalin cult. Where much of the previous study has 
addressed this question at a broader societal level, I will look to highlight and analyse the 
parallels between the cultural narrative and the role it played in creating the Stalin cult. This 
work will take heed from Clark and Plamper’s research and look to develop their hypothesis 
through a focused analysis on the spatial dimensions of the cult in the 1930s. In doing so, 
this paper will hope to demonstrate that through the aesthetic uses of space Stalin was able 
to build his cult around the relationship between centre and periphery. Despite there already 
being some excellent discourse on the conceptual space of Stalinism, I feel that these have 
not convincingly asserted the link between the 1930s spatial narratives and the facilitation 
of the Stalin cult. One of the key themes which I will address in my work is the ideological 
Bildungsroman. The political rite of passage was a tenet of the Bolshevik creed, internally 
there was a drive to be ‘party minded’ and externally there was a desire to be within the 
proximity of power. In the 1930s the Soviet Union underwent a radical metamorphosis; 
Stalin’s image saturated space and a complex system of symbols rearranged the hierarchy of 
Soviet space itself. The new structure of Soviet space had an emerging narrative of rituals, 
initiations and revelations. In my work I will compare the cultural representations of these 
transitory moments and journeys with the real-life incidents they paralleled. The result would 
be the creation of a spatial metanarrative that would actively undermine the boundaries 
                                                                                                                          
18  Ibid,  3.  
19  Ibid,  12.  
20  Ibid.  
  
  
10  
  
between reality and fiction, and in doing so facilitate a social temperament wherein such a 
cult could prosper. 
Surprisingly, theory from social anthropology has never really been incorporated into the 
study of the Stalin cult in the 1930s, despite it being rich with themes that invite cross-
disciplinary research. I feel that much of the discourse on rituals and the rite of passage 
which is found in these fields of study would provide an interesting new window into the 
Soviet 1930s. Victor Turner’s famous work The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-
Structure looks at the role of collective ritual as a dramatic phenomenon which attempts to 
bring life under control and assign identity, thus being a force that belongs to the structuring 
side of the cultural/historical process.21 The rite of passage narrative found in the Stalin cult, 
one which was filled with performance, ceremonies and rituals must then be analysed from 
this perspective. Anthropologist Sally Moore explains the importance of this study, “Rituals 
do much more than mirror existing social arrangements and existing model of thought. They 
can act to reorganise them or even create them”.22 By applying a new theory to the cultural 
landscape of Stalinism and its myriad of meanings, it is possible to see the importance of 
these narratives and events in shaping collective identity and generating the historical 
process. 
In the developing cosmos of Stalinism, these rites of passage laid the semantic foundation 
of Soviet space. In the thirties, the Stalin cult defined and was in turn, itself defined by two 
main spaces: Moscow and the Arctic. Whilst much of the literature that deals with the Stalin 
cult or Stalinist space in general, inevitably engages with Moscow as a space, there have 
been a few excellent studies such as Karl Schlögel tour-de-force Moscow 1937 which have 
revolutionised how Soviet space is understood. Schlögel’s work engages with Moscow as 
vast unfolding synchronous site of history, and in doing so Stalinism emerges as a dynamic 
force that simultaneously attempted to order and destabilise space as a system of meaning. 
Schlögel’s work combines the multi-disciplinary nature of works such as Dobrenko and 
Clark with an emphasis on historical veracity which is found in Soviet scholars such as 
Conquest and Fitzpatrick, the result is a stereoscopic all-round view of the chief site of 
Stalinist space. The framework for Stalinism to be deconstructed in terms of territoriality 
was broadened by Widdis’s aforementioned research, in particular Visions of a New Land. 
This looked at Stalinist cinema and how space was mapped, defined and semanticised. In 
this work, Stalinism is explored through the spatial binary of centre and the periphery. 
                                                                                                                          
21  Victor  Turner,  The  Ritual  Process:  Structure  and  Anti-­‐Structure  (Chicago:  Aldine  Publishing  
Company,  1969).  
22  Barbara  G.  Myerhoff  and  Sally.  Moore,  ed,  Secular  Ritual  (Amsterdam:  Van  Gorcum  &  Company,  1977),  5.  
  
  
11  
  
Although neither Schlögel’s nor Widdis’s work look specifically at the Stalin cult, they both 
expand the spatial framework through which the Stalinist system of meaning can be analysed.  
Whilst the work of Schlögel and Widdis add to the canon of literature on Stalin’s Moscow 
in the thirties, in terms of literature on the periphery, and in this case the Arctic, there has 
not been as much historical interest. This emerges as somewhat peculiar given that the Soviet 
Union was – and Russia still is –  obsessed with the Arctic. From the 1920s, the Bolsheviks 
went to extreme efforts to explore and incorporate the Arctic into the new Soviet space. 
Under Stalin in the thirties, this perennial campaign reached its zenith. In spite of capturing 
the Soviet imagination and functioning as one of the key myth-making spaces in the Stalinist 
topos, its importance has largely been side-lined. Historiographically overshadowed by 
discourse on Moscow, Stalin and the purges, Stalin’s Arctic is usually found in passing 
reference or in a small section spread across a few pages. When this does occur, Pier 
Horensma points out that they confine themselves “to the history of exploration, taking little 
notice of the political circumstances”.23 However, when viewed in the spatial framework of 
Stalinism, and crucially the Stalin cult, the Arctic emerges as a remarkable example of how 
space was mythologised in the 1930s. Despite being in the extreme periphery, the Arctic was 
one of the best examples of Stalinist super-centralising spatial. Its icy dunes became a mirror 
whereby Stalin could mould his image; inseminating the landscape with the same networks 
of meaning as the centre. Of the focused studies on the region in the period, John 
McCannon’s excellent Red Arctic treats the space with the rigour of analysis that it deserves. 
24 By tracking the development of the region through its expeditions individuals, and 
institutions, McCannon shows how the regions political, social, cultural and economic 
existence was intimately linked with its developing mythology back in the Moscow. What 
emerges is a clear picture of the complex symbolic relationship between centre and periphery. 
Taking heed from McCannon, I aim to show how the Stalin cult depended on the Arctic 
metanarrative and how the individuals, expeditions and institutions of the Red Arctic 
effected and were affected by Stalinism.  
 
Methodology  
In setting out to synthesize a vast body of sources I have drawn extensively from a diverse 
field of disciplines. Whilst being foundationally underpinned by historical principles, from 
the works conception it has been clear that for an original and synchronous study to be 
                                                                                                                          
23  Pier  Horsenma,  The  Soviet  Arctic  (Routledge:  London  and  New  York,  1991)  3.  
24  John  McCannon,  Red  Arctic:  Polar  Exploration  and  the  Myth  of  the  North  in  the  Soviet  Union,  1932-­‐1939  
(New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998).  
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undertaken that a multi-disciplinary approach would be best suited. Stemming 
concomitantly from the oeuvre of the revisionists, history is no longer History with a capital 
H. Therefore, whilst a study of the Stalin cult will be unavoidably about Stalin, such works 
are no longer academically bound to the big names, big events, big headlines and big 
conclusions. It is crucial that Stalin is continually deconstructed, diffused and discovered 
through as many optics as possible. In doing so, the landscape of Stalinism at once emerges 
and remerges as a synchronous history of objects, spaces, symbols and meanings. As the 
scope for study broadens the notion of a histoire totale is what should appropriately be 
strived for, even if it is never fully attainable. In Karl Schlögel’s Moscow 1937, he 
compounds this notion arguing that this period cannot be comprehended through singular 
approaches. Rather, there was a “simultaneity” of disparate trends and phenomena, different 
accounts and objects that provide different perspectives on the same moment, and they 
should all be considered.25  
Space permitting, this thesis will incorporate Schlögel’s analytical framework and 
supplement the account of the Stalin cult in the 1930s. This will be done by tapering my 
scope of study specifically around the spatial narrative of the Stalin cult, whilst 
simultaneously broadening my methodological framework. In doing so, I will show the 
semantic importance of the spatial dimensions of the Stalin cult, how Stalinist space was 
produced, and its function. This will be undertaken by a dynamic, diverse approach using 
theory and sources from areas such as cinema, anthropology, architecture, literature, media, 
and biography. Whilst markedly eclectic, no singular methodology has not been applied with 
such rigor to please an ardent structuralist. This is because to understand the complexity of 
Stalinist space, it is essential to deconstruct the different components of the space itself and 
look at their symbiotic relationship. In this synchronous approach the Stalin cult emerges as 
an inherently spatial production, configured around a series of juxtaposed paradigms: centre 
and periphery, old and new, chosen and not chosen. These dialectics can be seen as the 
structuring force of cultural Stalinism, concurrently ordering everything from photographs 
to architecture. Yet, on the other hand these dialectics embody the sequence of destruction 
and creation as a constant unstable cycle – both ordering and disordering the topography of 
Stalinism.  
Here, the multi-disciplinary nature of my approach has helped me move between these 
different perspectives and sources allowing me to show the complex nature of the Stalin cult 
and its relationship with space. For example, in Chapter One, the centralisation of Stalin’s 
                                                                                                                          
25  Schlögel,  Moscow  1937,  3.  
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image and the construction of Moscow as a sacred centre are examined. Throughout the 
chapter different visual sources such as photographs, paintings and architecture designs are 
analysed. Indeed, as Jan Plamper argues the “Stalin cult was an overwhelmingly visual 
phenomenon, tailored to a population whose mental universe was shaped primarily by 
images”.26 Therefore in Chapter One, the aestheticisation of the Stalin cult and its symbiosis 
with Moscow as the developing axis mundi is traced primarily using a visual methodology.  
By drawing from a broad pool of sources, the chapter explores how Soviet space was 
saturated with images of Stalin, particularly with the emerging canon of stock photographs. 
These representations followed a series of tropes which were hinged around placing Stalin 
at the top of the visual hierarchy. For example, I use a photograph of Stalin meeting with 
Otto Schmidt and his crew after the Chelyuskin expedition. In this photograph, Stalin’s 
importance is visually marked using a series of representational tropes. This photograph was 
also chosen as it also ties in with the themes of the other chapters with Stalin aligning himself 
with the Arctic myth and its heroes. Later in Chapter One, I use Aleksandr Gerasimov’s 
painting, Stalin and Voroshilov in the Kremlin, to demonstrate how the visual hierarchy of 
representations of Stalin functioned in the high arts. If the photograph with Schmidt is a 
window on to Pravda and the pictorial evolution of the cult, then Gerasimov’s painting 
“lends itself to a hermeneutics of a (indeed, the) socialist realist leader portrait.”27 Therefore, 
these two, very different visual sources can be analysed together in terms of visual canon of 
Stalin’s image  and aesthetic process that achieved this, but also separately to understand 
how the specific medium reacted to this process. In other places, the spatial poetics of the 
Stalin cult manifested themselves in more nuanced ways, such as the rhetoric around the 
building of the Moscow metro or the plans to build the Palace of the Soviets. 
One of the central tenets in the ‘overwhelmingly visual’ cosmos of the Stalin cult was 
cinema. Not only was it an extremely effective apparatus due to its ability to circumvent the 
problems implied by illiteracy, but it was seen as a “means of creating a new relationship 
between Soviet man and woman and the physical world”.28 As socialist realism took over 
the arts in the thirties, cinema, arguably, became the sphere of culture where the Stalinist 
system of myth-making and meaning functioned best. By deconstructing and analysing these 
filmic sources within their own systems of meaning and their own generic conventions, and 
by also seeing how they matched up with ‘reality’, I will trace the intersection of the real 
and imaginary geographies of Stalinism. For example, in Chapter Two, the spatial 
                                                                                                                          
26  Plamper,  Stalin  Cult,  xv  
27  Ibid,  223.  
28  Widdis,  Visions  of  a  New  Land,  13.  
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metanarrative will be explored in the context of the Stakhanovite movement. By juxtaposing 
cultural manifestations of this such as Aleksandrov’s film The Radiant Path with real life 
accounts from their Kremlin ceremonies and Stakhanovite conferences, the synergic fusion 
of fact and fiction which facilitated the Stalin cult will be explored. The Radiant Path was 
chosen as it was one of the crowning examples of the socialist realist cinema and, in 
particularly, because the way Aleksandrov reconfigures Stakhanovism excellently shows 
how reality was reimagined according to this narrative. This ability to marry sources from 
different disciplines makes the nature of my study inherently useful. Through showing how 
these sources interact, the spatial metanarrative which underpinned the cult appears as a 
synchronous structuring force. It is possible to read the landscape of Stalinism as a highly 
complex, connected system of objects, spaces, people and myths. Therefore, my 
methodological framework is concerned with not only how reality is ordered by culture, but 
also how culture is ordered by reality (or a perceived reality).  
Whilst I will not be able to explain all aspects of my extensive methodology in this section, 
I will briefly highlight one more type of source which proved to be invaluable in latter stages 
of this work. In Chapter Three, where the territorial emphasis of my analysis switches to the 
Arctic, I drew heavily from several non-fiction accounts such as Brontman’s On Top of the 
World and Smolka’s Forty Thousand Against the Arctic. Although the authors each come 
from different contexts – Smolka, a British journalist; Brontman, a Pravda journalist –  their 
accounts both use socialist realist lexicon and they both define their geography relative to 
Stalin and the centre. Their rhetoric mirrored the centralised discourse on the conquest, or 
perhaps more fittingly, Stalinisation of the extreme periphery. This shows just how 
transcendent the cultural and psychological landscape of the Stalin cult was. The spatial 
metanarrative and all its components were superimposed on space, and this was reflected in 
the icy dunes of the Arctic landscape. Along with these non-fiction accounts, media and 
memoir sources will be used to show how Stalin recreated the mental topography of the 
centre in the Arctic tabula rasa. 
Another theme worth noting in this thesis is the terror and its relationship with space. I 
will show how the terror was incorporated into the spatial metanarrative of the Stalin cult, 
and in doing so will hope to provide a synthesised account of the cultural space of Stalinism 
and the political realities of its production. Despite the increasing volume of interdisciplinary 
studies on cultural Stalinism and the cultural aspect of cult, this is something which tends to 
be seen as incompatible to the theoretical convenience of many scholars, as Clark notes in 
her introduction to Moscow, The Fourth Rome, “I seek to tell the cultural history of the 1930s 
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without dwelling on the purges”.29 Where my study eschews the temptation of omitting the 
role of the purges in shaping the cultural landscape of Stalinism, admittedly it does not 
attempt to look at the terror with the same depth of analysis as other components of the 
spatial narrative. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, and perhaps most obviously, the 
time constraints and spatial limitations which are inherent to the nature of my research. 
Secondly, the aim of the study is not to mediate some middle ground between those who 
study the cult as a purely terror-based phenomenon and those who look at the cult through a 
cultural lens. The work is mainly in the vein of the latter; however, it is imperative to 
incorporate the broader perspective of the terror into my research and show how it too can 
be defined through the lexicon of the cultural apparatus. For example, in section 2.4 the 
spatial mythology of the sacred centre is examined through the Third Rome myth and 
Stalin’s rehabilitation of historic figures. The theoretical scope of my analysis looks at 
sources such as films, history textbooks and memoirs. However, rather than focus on these 
sources from a purely terror or cultural perspective, the section uses sources such as 
Eisenstein’s film Ivan the Terrible (1940) to show the synergic relationship between 
mythology and the terror. By looking at how the terror was shaped and imagined in the 
cultural sphere, it shows how the Stalin cult used the spatial metanarrative as a means of 
justification through historical contingency.   
 
Outline 
This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter One will explore the construction of Moscow 
as the Soviet Union’s sacred centre and how this process was connected to the building of 
the Stalin Cult. Section 1.1 will briefly contextualise the structural foundation of the 
Bolshevik power dynamic, suggesting that a culture of veneration was already manifested 
within the party before the revolution. In section 1.2, the emergence of the visual Stalin cult 
will be analysed through looking at the centralisation of Stalin’s image in public and private 
Soviet space. Section 1.3 will focus on the spatial purification of Moscow through the 1935 
General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow. This will look at the planned 
metamorphosis of the cityscape through structures like the Moscow Metro and the Palace of 
Soviets and how Stalin utilised the narratives that were connected with them. 
Chapter Two will then look at how cultural mediums were advocated by the ideological 
Bildungsroman: a narrative that depicted the journey to Moscow as a highly sacral rite of 
passage, wherein one could gain a higher state of consciousness through spatial proximity 
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to the Soviet Union’s spatial trinity: Moscow, the Kremlin and Stalin. Section 2.1 will 
contextualise the landscape of Stalinism by discussing the theory surrounding the dynamics 
of Soviet Union’s physical and mental space and how its spatial make-up was conductive to 
the development of this narrative. Section 2.2 will analyse the socialist realism in relation to 
the spatial metanarrative of Stalinism, this will be done through decoding the dialectic 
structure was the foundation of the movement. Section 2.3 will study the emergence of the 
Stakhanovites as representing a qualitative change in human anthropology and the Stalinist 
ordering of reality. After analysing the ‘real’ Stakhanovite movement, I will then use 
Aleksandrov’s Stakhanovite fairy tale, The Radiant Path, as a comparative socialist realist 
case study. In the final part of this chapter, Section 2.4, the revival of the Third Rome myth 
and the historical rehabilitation –  and subsequent Stalinisation – of Ivan the Terrible will be 
explored. This section will look at how Stalin altered elements of history to justify the terror 
in the context of a historically ‘progressive’ spatial metanarrative, of which, he was the 
inheritor. 
In Chapter Three, I will explore how this inward spatial motion was then reversed outward 
in an attempt to remake nature in the image of the centre This will be explored through the 
Soviet’s most extreme periphery – the Arctic. Section 3.1 will map how the reorientation of 
social temperament from logical to mystical elicited the start of a fantastical thought climate; 
the arena for this thought to turn into action was the Arctic. In section 3.2, the concept of the 
Arctic frontier is analysed, focusing on Stalin’s spatial conquest to create a ‘Red Arctic’. In 
section 3.3, the paradigm of the Arctic hero will be explored. Through their ritualised 
passages through Soviet space, they gained a special relationship with Stalin, one which had 
cultic implications for both parties. Finally, section 3.4 will explore how the purges impacted 
the periphery and the implications this had, not only for the developing Arctic myth and its 
figureheads, but also for Stalin himself.   
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Chapter One: The Sacred Centre 
 
1.1  Big Ideas: Soso and the Seminary  
 
Move tirelessly  
Do not hang your head  
Scatter the mist of the clouds  
The Lord's Providence is great.  
Gently smile at the earth  
Stretched out beneath you;  
Sing a lullaby to the glacier  
Strung down from the heavens.  
Know for certain that once  
Struck down to the ground, an oppressed man  
Strives again to reach the pure mountain,  
When exalted by hope. 
– To the Moon, Soselo (Joseph Stalin) 
On the precipice of the twentieth century, tucked away in the mountainous South 
Georgian topography, tears streamed down the face of Keke Dzhugasvili. It was the summer 
of 1895, Keke, bloated with sorrow and pride was bidding farewell to her son. Her 
exceptionally astute little ‘Soso’ was about to embark on his path to priesthood, he had won 
a scholarship to study at Tiflis Theological Seminary, the best religious educational institute 
in the Southern Empire. As this aspiring young priest-poet set off from the small colourful 
town of Gori, it seemed that against all the odds Keke’s dream for her son to become a bishop 
was set to become a reality. She was the happiest mother in the world.30 However, the tale 
that was to unfold was to be drastically different from her idealised Bildungsroman. “No 
secular school,” wrote Filipp Makharazde, “produced as many atheists as the Tiflis 
Seminary”.31 It was in this setting that young Soso was exposed to the actions and ideas that 
irrecoverably formed his character; the setting that made him Stalin. In this juxtaposed 
environment religion and Marxism fought for the minds of these young men. From the off it 
seems that the trajectory of Soso’s path was to be in the purist of the latter. Marxism had 
captured the temperament of this young man and would go on to shape his future.  
However, in the legacy he would leave it is possible to see the remnants of the Tiflis 
Seminary’s paradoxical atmosphere imprinted on the USSR. Stalin and the Bolsheviks may 
have been Marxists, but the poetics of power were deeply rooted in the pseudo-religious 
state they built. In their physical and mental organising of space, they created a power 
                                                                                                                          
30  Simon  Montefiore,  Young  Stalin  (New  York:  Phoenix  Publishing,  2007),  51.  
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network based around pseudo-religious veneration of sites and people. This was by the holy 
trinity of Moscow, the Kremlin and Stalin. In all spheres of society, the channels of power 
gravitated in concentric circles around Moscow: the centralised apex of influence. Within 
the realms of Moscow, the centralised spatial configuration became more intra-sacral with 
the Kremlin being the last physical intermediary before Stalin. This set up Stalin as the 
dominant power purveyor within the sacralised centre of Moscow. In this chapter I will I 
will examine the creation of myth surrounding the Soviet centre and how Stalin placed 
himself at its very core. In the first section I will trace the Stalin centrality cult, focusing on 
his placement in the centre. In the second section, I will look at how the centre was 
constructed and Stalin’s role as Moscow’s moderniser.  
 
1.2. ‘Happy Birthday, Comrade Stalin’: The Centralisation of Stalin’s Image    
 
I opened the door and saw a portrait. Then the portrait started walking towards me… Just 
imagine! Stalin himself had walked down the corridor of a communal flat.  
–  Life and Fate, Vasilii Grossman 
 
On the 21st of December 1929 the cult was inaugurated when Stalin turned fifty years 
old. The cult burst on to the scene in the state’s premier newspaper Pravda. This newspaper 
would not only launch the cult, but over the next 23 years it was to become its primary 
medium. In the special eight-page edition of Pravda on the 21 December Stalin was lauded 
by fellow Bolsheviks and established literary figures for his different accomplishments as 
party leader, with articles such as Ordzhonikidze’s A Staunch Stalin and Demian Bedny’s 
Poem I am Certain.32 In James Heizer diachronic analysis of the 117 birthday greetings in 
Pravda, he highlights that there were 201 cases of language that referred to him as “leader”.  
The most frequent of these terms was rukovoditel’, terminology which indicated that Stalin 
was performing his capacity as a leader (76 out of 201 times), and vozhd’, a term loaded with 
sacral connotations such as prophetic leader and charismatic hero.33 If compared to the 
lexicon of language that party members associated with Stalin in the mid-1920s, with words 
such as khoziain (boss) generally being the operative phrase, it is possible to trace the 
elevation of language.34 These three terms alone form something of a linguistic Jacobs ladder, 
the semantic difference between khozyain, rukovoditel’ and vozhd’ reflects the changing 
attitudes as Stalin took power. The overwhelmingly verbal introduction of the cult gives us 
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a glimpse into the orchestrated dynamics behind it. Although what was to ensue would be a 
visual extravaganza, this is still nonetheless a crucial moment in the public placement of 
Stalin.  
After a notable absence from Pravda, Stalin remerged in mid-1933 as the immobile centre 
of the Soviet Union with an unrelenting centrality cult dominating the cultural narrative. It 
now seemed that all forms of culture from high to low were preoccupied with placing Stalin 
in the centre. Before his pictorial representation was confined primarily to the ‘Stalin 
portrait’, there had to be way for him to be distinguished in photos. Therefore, in order to 
elevate Stalin’s image above those who were in his pictorial proximity an array of visual 
strategies was used. In these varying techniques the principal goal was to subliminally 
reinforce Stalin’s centrality; this was achieved through a combination of subtle 
characteristics that set him apart from his colleagues. A visual canon of Stalin’s image was 
created with a specific criterion; his spatial placement, physical size, colour of clothing and 
the direction of his gaze. In each pictorial representation these features were tailored to make 
Stalin distinct from those around him. For example, on 6 June 1934 the cover of Pravda 
showed a photograph of Stalin and his party members with Otto Schmidt, leader of the 
famous Arctic expedition ship Chelyuskin (Figure. 1).35 In this photograph, Stalin dressed 
in a white uniform, occupies the centre staring directly into the lens. On the other hand, all 
of the other seven people in the photograph are all wearing black with their gaze fixed outside 
of the camera. Jan Plamper argues that it is likely Stalin’s white uniform was retouched, or 
even an entirely different photograph glued on, as his body shape looks very unnatural.36   
This retouched photograph was one of the 68 visual depictions of Stalin that year. This 
number had increased by 57 when compared to the 11 representations of Stalin in 1929. The 
visual trajectory of his depictions in Pravda continued to surge throughout the 1930’s, 
reaching an all-time high in 1939 with 142 pictorial representations.37 Although these figures 
are indicative of the increasing emphasis on the placement of Stalin’s image into the centre 
of Soviet media, they perhaps fail to give an insight into the consumption of his image. On 
a micro level: who were the consumers of his image? How was it consumed? Were they 
receptive?  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
35  See  cover  of  Pravda,  No.  154,  06  June  1934.  Pravda  Digital  Archive      
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21737805  [Accessed  11  November  2016].        
36  Ibid.  
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Figure 1. Pravda cover, Stalin with Otto Schmidt and the Chelyuskin Crew, 06 June 1934.  
 
A potential window into the individual’s daily transaction with Stalin’s image may be the 
‘red corner’ – an answer to the ‘icon corner’ – this spatial construct was the meeting point 
of the macro and micro. 38  The merging of public and private space through personal 
iconography had a long-standing history in the Russian household. Originating in the 
practices of the Orthodox Church this was a process that was shrouded in mysticism and was 
one of many notable religious appropriations made by the Bolsheviks.39  The secularisation 
of such a practice after Lenin’s death in 1924 did not remove the quasi-religious overtones, 
instead it positioned Lenin and Stalin as natural heirs to this spiritual lineage. Through the 
dissemination of Stalinist iconography, the red corner became a strange material portal 
throughout the 1930s, one whereby Stalin’s image radiated from the centre, occupying 
Soviet personal space. In his book, Magnetic Mountain, Stephen Kotkin describes the 
construction of Magnitogorsk, a new industrial city in the southern Ural.40  Every living 
barracks in this newly built city contained a red corner, in which, according to John Scott 
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39  Victoria  Bonnell,  Iconography  of  Power:  Soviet  Political  Posters  Under  Lenin  and  Stalin  (Berkeley:    
University  of  California  Press,  1997),  148.  
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typically hung, “the barrack[s] wall newspaper, two udarnik [shock worker] banners, [and] 
pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Voroshilov”.41 The red corner was more than a showcase, it 
was a site of mobilization where one was encouraged to discuss and engage in party ideology, 
in many respects echoing the kruzhok system. However, the transition between belief 
systems in these veneration sites was not always straightforward. One Soviet mechanic 
recollected: “Once my elder brother there [sic] who was a member of the Communist Party 
was visiting at home and he told my mother about this [that Stalin’s picture was to be hung]: 
he told her that she should replace the picture of God in her icon with that of Stalin.”42 
Accounts like this give an insight into the logistics of Stalin’s image and how it diffused 
from the larger edifice of the state to the everyday citizen. The placement of Stalin in the 
home reconfigured the spatial temperament of the Soviet domestic life. This icon corner 
became a centralising space, one which was politically and geographically referential to 
Stalin and Moscow.   
It is perhaps difficult to fathom from today’s perspective the cultic effect of such a 
singular, saturated space. However, these accounts from Soviet citizens go a long way in 
helping one comprehend the profound psychological implications of the visual Stalin cult, 
one of which came from Sergei Kavtradze, an Old Bolshevik, who often told the following 
story. In 1940 after he had been released from the Gulag, Stalin and Beria accompanied him 
to his old apartment in Moscow. When they knocked on the door of his now occupied flat a 
woman answered. Upon seeing Stalin, she staggered back and fainted, however, Beria 
managed to catch her thereby stopping her from falling. He proceeded to then shake her hand 
and ask her what it was that had frightened her. The woman then told Beria that “I thought 
that a portrait of Stalin was moving towards me”.43  Stories like this show how Stalin’s 
portrait manifested itself into the subjective conscious of its audience. For many the cult of 
Stalin and all the mythical cleavage that came with it was tied up, not in the man, but in the 
portrait.   
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1.3. A Vision of the Future: Constructing the Centre   
 
Convinced that every innovation in the city influences the sky’s pattern, before taking 
any decisions they calculate the risks for and advantages for themselves and for the city 
and for all worlds.  
– Invisible Cities, Italo Calvino 
 
 
By the latter half of the 1930’s the cult had become more legitimatised. In this period the 
aesthetic narrative of the centrality myth can best be analysed in Stalinist high culture. 
Perhaps of all the works that exhibit the classic trademarks Stalinist spatial organisation, the 
one that illustrates it best is the most famous, Aleksandr Gerasimov’s 1938 Stalin and 
Voroshilov in the Kremlin (Fig. 1). This painting was the culmination of the 1930’s Stalinist 
spatial narrative, marrying the three sacred pillars of the centre; Stalin, the Kremlin and 
Moscow. The visual arrangement of the painting sequentially depicts these three pillars in 
order of consecration. The viewers gaze is firstly drawn to Stalin and Voroshilov pacing the 
inner Kremlin, then to the Kremlin Tower and finally to the Moscow backdrop. The space 
is composed in a spherical style with concentric circles grouping around Stalin, the centre. 
Moreover, Mikhail lampol’skii taking heed from the observations in Walter Benjamin’s 
Moscow Diary, has drawn attention to the absence of anthropomorphic monuments inside 
the Kremlin. He argues that the powerful aesthetic positioning of Stalin, who is firmly 
planted as the immobile centre with his motionless footing, was an attempt to monumentalise 
Stalin inside the Kremlin on a meta-level.44  The modesty of Stalin in his simple grey 
overcoat is directly contrasted to Voroshilov, who is highly decorated with insignia to 
represent his high martial post. The compositional outcome of this is that Stalin appears calm 
and comfortable in the centre, his habitual environment.45 Stalin’s penetrating gaze into the 
distance, the USSR’s glorious future, is mirrored in the linear composition of the painting’s 
geography. 46  The motion of the work follows Stalin’s eye line and is reflected in the 
transformative Moscow skyline. To the left three cupolas of a Russian Orthodox church are 
receding out of the picture, old Russia has been overcome. In the more immediate 
background it is possible to see Stalin’s spatial purification of Moscow through the House 
of Government and the newly built stone bridge (located across the river to the far right). 
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This purification was according to the General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow in 
1935.  This plan was emblematic of the 1930’s attitude towards Moscow, one which seen it 
as a place of architectural fantasy and a reach for the future. As the centre of the Soviet  
 
Figure 2. Aleksandr Gerasimov, Stalin and Voroshilov in the Kremlin, 1938.47  
 
cosmos Moscow had to be remade to suit this new role. Lazar Kaganovich, the commissar 
in charge of the city’s reconstruction, acknowledged this task, Moscow was to become a 
space “worthy of the country, and worthy of the proletariat”.48  
The General Plan did not appear out of thin air; it was the product of a collective effort 
of many committees over a number of years. The planned metamorphosis of the cityscape 
was to echo the historical, radical structure of Moscow, with its emphasis on a central point: 
a utopian node or omphalos.49 The city centre was to become a public space, one which 
advocated the collective ideology of the state. These central spaces were a facade – 
pertaining no real purpose – they were spaces of aesthetic performance. An example of this 
performative, emblematic organising of the centre can be seen in the plans for the Palace of 
                                                                                                                          
47  Aleksandr  Gerasimov,  Stalin  and  Voroshilov  in  the  Kremlin,  1938.  
http://www.tretyakovgallery.ru/en/collection/_show/image/_id/2207  [accessed  25  January  2016]    
48  Widdis,  Visions  of  a  New  Land,  166.  
49  Ibid,  167.  
  
  
24  
  
Soviets (Fig. 2). This neoclassical statue of Lenin, planned to be the tallest building in the 
world at the time, was to be the centrepiece of the city.50  
The Palace of Soviets can be seen as the inauguration of a period of architectural reverie, 
it occasioned one of the century’s greatest architectural competitions in which luminaires 
from the Soviet Union and abroad took part. When it was chosen in 1933 as competition 
winner, Boris Iofan’s monolithic Stalinist structure was an emblem of the radical realigning 
of the architectural principles. Sona Stephan Hoisington in her study of the Palace of Soviets 
argues that its architectural evolution encapsulates the changing socio-cultural models of the 
Soviet Union in the 1930s. By looking at the rudiments of the plan in 1931, it is possible to 
see “what started out as a practical complex of interrelated structures – public spaces for 
demonstrations, a library and assembly halls… rapidly transformed into a symbol of Soviet 
might, a sacred temple, a temple to the revolution and to its deity, Lenin”.51 The initial site 
for the Palace of Soviets was to be a market area known as Okhotnyi riad – chosen because 
it was adjacent to the Red Square and for its practical advantages: it was compact, contained 
structures that were easy to remove, thus making it a location where the project could be 
realistically completed by 1934.52 However, in early June 1931, with almost no notice or 
preparation, the Construction Council decided to relocate the project to a more prominent 
site.  The new location was to be one mile along the Moscow River from the Kremlin – the 
then (and now restored) – Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. This decision is crucial in 
illuminating the trajectory of the changing Soviet mental landscape for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, this was a departure from the logical positivism that dominated the 1920s; the 1930s 
saw an inversion of these principles as the power of reason was muffled by the promise of 
splendour. The organisational negligence in the process can be seen in the absence of studies 
carried out prior to moving site: practicality, feasibility and viability seemed to be 
afterthoughts. Archival materials attest to this – M. V. Kruikov, the Directorate of 
Construction – was still trying to acquire detailed information about the site more than six 
weeks after the decision was made.  Secondly, the space was obviously selected for its 
political symbolism. The Cathedral of Christ the Saviour was the personification of old 
Moscow, its dual lineage with the two great edifices of pre-revolution Russia – the monarchy 
and the church – made it a highly charged focal point in the cityscape. The demolition of 
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such a sacrosanct structure was a dramatic aesthetic performance, the use of dynamite made 
the destruction a graphic spectacle; Stalin’s Moscow was coming. 
Figure 3. B. M Iofan, V. A Schuko, and V.G. Gel’freikh, The Palace of Soviets, 1934.53 
 
In the aftermath of the demolition it became apparent that a great vacuum had been left. 
The sudden removal of such a consecrated, concentrated site of meaning invoked a sense of 
spatial anxiety. This was a physical sense of loss on a grand scale and from this moment on 
I would argue that the designs for the Palace of Soviets were consciously aimed at spatial 
reconciliation. However, the Construction Council now faced a dilemma: the majority of the 
designs it had chosen in the Open Competition were functional, abstract, anti-monumental 
buildings. The designs lacked anything “Soviet”: the international language of the modernist 
forms was a huge juxtaposition to the historical nature of the demolished Christ the Saviour. 
An example of this style can be seen in Le Corbusier’s famous 1931 submission (Fig. 4). 
The design reflected the original stipulations; however, its configuration fell short in a 
climate where modernism was losing ground. Ultimately, in a closed competition a select 
number of architects were given a brief which lay out stylistic directives, these emphasised 
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height and hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, at the same time Aleksei Tolstoi published an article 
about the project in Izvestiia, the title of which ‘In Search of Monumentality’.54 After Iofan’s 
design was chosen in 1933, the evolution of the projects planning entered into the realms of 
architectural decadence. The proportions of the edifice continued to grow with the 
prominence of Lenin as the structural stasis becoming increasingly pronounced. At 415 - 
meters high the statue was to be taller than the Empire State building, the proposed 100-
meter statue of Lenin would embody the conceptual function of Jeremy Bentham’s 
panopticon, gazing out from the centre into the Soviet periphery.  
Figure 4. Le Corbusier, Palais des Soviets, 1930.    
 
Although never built, the story of the Palace of Soviets took on an official genesis myth: 
Stalin overseeing the project, not only chose the site, but also declared that the huge statue 
of Lenin should crown the totem.55 Now established, the myth was perpetuated through a 
plethora of sketches, models, films and articles. This was to such an extent that, despite never 
being built, the Palace of Soviets was one of the icons of the decade. Sheila Fitzpatrick 
correctly points out, its “image was more familiar than most actual buildings”.56 When it 
comes to trying to understand the psychological landscape of the Stalinist era, there is 
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perhaps no better anecdote than the Palace of Soviets. Through the propagation of images, 
the myth of the Palace of Soviets became a conceived virtual reality. Propaganda films such 
as Lidiia Stepanova’s Dvorets Sovetov: Kino-Ocherk (Palace of Soviets: A Film Essay), gave 
the impression that the Palace of Soviets already dominated the Moscow landscape.57 The 
deliberate blurring of the present and future and illusion and truth, were key characteristics 
of the emerging Stalinist myth canon. Such is the paradoxical nature of the period, that the 
new capital of socialisms crowning centrepiece existed only in notion. This reflected in the 
following statement by Stalin:  
 
What is most important to the dialectical method is not that which is stable at present but 
is already beginning to die, but rather that which is emerging and developing, even if at 
present it does not appear stable, since for the dialectic method only that which is 
emerging and developing cannot be overcome.58   
 
However, this was not the case with all projects, as radical as some elements of the plans 
for the “capital worthy of the proletarian state”, much of it was out of necessity.59 The 
infrastructure of Moscow was in bad need of modernizing, and this task was taken up all at 
once, in one great push. Even before the creation of Stalin’s definitive General Plan the 
structural creases of the cityscape were beginning to be ironed out. For example, with the 
construction of the Moscow-Volga Canal, beginning in 1931, the Bolsheviks managed to fix 
the “error of nature” that had left the capital “deprived of a powerful water artery”.60 This 
resurrection saw Moscow become the infrastructural heart of the USSR again. Although the 
spatial restructuring of Moscow would look to maintain much of the city’s historical 
continuity, it was primarily concerned with the recodification of the urban texture. In an 
attempt to ‘Stalinize’ the city’s system of symbols, the Bolsheviks obliterated sites of 
cultural vestige, or reinvented them to align with the developing Soviet schema.61 This was 
achieved through the renaming of streets and squares, or by demolishing places that were 
too strongly associated with the old regime; one example can be seen in replacement of the 
tsarist emblems on the Kremlin towers with backlit red stars. Furthermore, in the mass 
demolition: the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, the Sukharev Tower, Kazan Cathedral and 
the Red Gates (to name a few) all made way for the new Moscow.62 The result of which was, 
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as Graeme Gill points out in his study of Soviet symbols, that “Moscow [was] turned into a 
gigantic site for the presentation of the regime’s symbol”.63  
One of the tenets of Stalin’s modernising master narrative was the Moscow Metro. In the 
discourse of the metro, the totality of language saw the recodification of the old Moscow 
termed out in military metaphor: “we simply do not build the metropolitan, we fought for 
the victory of our first Soviet metropolitan”.64 The construction was a direct rehabilitation 
of tainted space. Kaganovich saw the metro as a war against the pre-revolutionary, old 
regime geology of Moscow.65 As Mikhail Ryklin points out, in the Stalinist modus operandi 
“to build, was above all, to do battle”.66 The language that was used to term the building of 
the Metro, would be mobilized again, not only in military campaigns, but in the declaration 
of war against nature (see chapter 3). The rhetoric works twofold: it sacralises the 
achievements of the new Moscow, whilst simultaneously defaming the old. Like the Palace 
of Soviets, the metro became fetishised in the cultural sphere. Writers refused to let the Metro 
simply be a place, juxtaposed with a stream of criticism of Western metros in cities such as 
New York and Paris, the Moscow Metro was a sacred dimension.  
The conceptual premise of the structure was symptomatic of Stalin’s spatial designs for 
the sacred centre. One of the paramount features of the Metro was the emphasis on illusionist 
lightning in each station. The theme was of an unspecific palatial space, a sunlit palace in an 
unknown scene: a utopia. Each station was to have a unique design, but all were to be lit by 
“the same light of progressive, victorious socialism”.67 The light of the Metro took on a 
fabled significance as the radiance of the centre, like the dominant trend of the 1930s the 
present and the future was merged through a sort of narrative folklore. In a children’s story 
taken from the book, Ready! Stories and Poems of the Metro, an old peasant man visits 
Moscow to see his daughter who is working on the Metro. As he enters the metro the celestial 
lightning throws him into a state of confusion, thinking that he has entered the Tsar’s palace 
he instinctively removes his hat. His daughter explains to him that this extraordinary place 
was built by the people: “We built them ourselves, we did the digging and we put up the 
palaces”. Upon hearing this, the old man is overwhelmed by an epiphany of ideology, this 
encounter here at the centre has helped him see the principles of the new ideology. After 
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deciding that this is a utopia he cannot leave, the old man then decides to move to Moscow 
and ride the underground every day.68  
The Moscow Metro, the opening of which was the apogee of the city’s metamorphosis, 
was much more than a transportation system. It was a site of national myth, an invitation and 
a symbol for those all over the Soviet Union come to the progressive capital of the world 
and marvel at the power of socialism. The Metro was one of the principal symbols of the 
new Stalinist culture with its dazzling aesthetic it provided the centre with a mythical 
microcosm of the new socialist order. These structures of new Moscow worked as new sites 
of memory, spaces wherein Stalin could actively legitimise his power by attaching himself 
to the city’s developing spatial legacy. Of course, it was Stalin and Kaganovich who became 
known as the chief architects of the collective project. The first stop on the Metro line was 
named after Kaganovich (which may have been due to Stalin’s peculiar and often sporadic 
use of modesty), and Stalin appeared on the front cover of the published General Plan for 
the Reconstruction of Moscow. Moreover, after Stalin’s address at the opening of the L.M 
Kaganovich Metro in 1935, despite his attempts to emphasise the role of the worker in the 
construction, the hall was still filled with the cry: “Hurrah for beloved Stalin!".69  
As the architect and overseer of such a momentous vision for a city, Stalin in many 
regards can be seen as taking up the lineage of Russia’s most loved Tsar, Peter the Great. In 
collective memory, both of these men are strongly embedded into the fabric of their 
respective cities, Moscow and St Petersburg. Both Stalin and Peter the Great shared a 
singular vision for their cityscapes: to place them in the zenith of time. These two were the 
state-builders of Russia, the modernisers of space. Surprisingly, despite a relic of the old 
regime, Peter the Great was prosaically used as a propaganda icon throughout the 1930’s. 
As a hero from the distant past, he was the vessel through which some sense of historical 
legitimacy could be maintained.70 In 1937, under Stalin’s guidance, Vladimir Petrov’s and 
Aleksei Tolstoi’s film Peter the First was released in theatres across the USSR. Audiences 
were shocked at the positive transformation of the Russian imperial past into a historical 
epic. Tolstoi, who may have felt the need to justify the subject matter, noted in an interview: 
“Iosif Vissarionovich [Stalin] went over our plans very attentively, approved them and gave 
us direction”. Outlining these directions, he added that Stalin had told him “The boyars’ dark 
                                                                                                                          
68  ibid,  265.      
69See  J.  V  Stalin,  Address  to  the  Solemn  Meeting  on  the  Opening  of  the  L.  M.  Kaganovich  Metro,  14  May  
1935  in  Pravda  taken  from  Marxists  Internet  Archive  
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1935/05/14.htm    
70  David  Brandenberger,  National  Bolshevism:  Stalinist  Mass  Culture  and  the  Formation  of  Modern    
Russian  National  identity  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University,  2002),  57.  
  
  
30  
  
uncultured Rus’, with their backward technology… would have fallen to invaders. A 
revolution was necessary…in order to lift Russia up to the level of the cultured European 
countries”.71 It is apparent that Stalin was trying to establish historical continuity between 
Peter’s circumstances and his own; this statement is reflective of the state-building rhetoric 
of the 1930’s. However, in Stalin’s vision the spatial axis of the USSR had to be reoriented 
away from the fringe territory of St Petersburg and back to the old centre, Moscow. Stalin 
looked to move away from the window opened to the West created by Peter, instead 
constructing a Soviet-centric space, with Moscow as its axis mundi.      
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Chapter Two: All Roads Lead to Moscow 
 
2.1. Ritual, Space and Power: The Semanticisation of the Soviet Topos 
Space is fundamental in any exercise of power. 
– Michel Foucault  
    
In his attempt to transform Moscow into a ‘Fourth Rome’, Stalin sought out to reconfigure 
the physical and mental vastness of the Russian landscape.72 Due to the spatiotemporal 
otherness of the Russian topography, the creation of a highly charged sacred centre was a 
way of focalising the boundless open space. If approached through the lens of Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s conceptual chronotope, it becomes apparent that in Soviet civilisation the chronos 
(time) is consistently swallowed up by the topos (space).73 The boundless impenetrability of 
Soviet space extended into the realms of time, with pre-industrialised Russia and areas of 
the Soviet periphery being frozen in the historical moment. This peculiarity sees Russian 
space regulate a temporal imbalance which further separates the periphery from the centre. 
The infinite vastness of the dispersive landscape stands in stark contrast to the dynamics of 
centralisation on which the Stalinist regime is built. This opposition becomes particularly 
evident in the case of the dense urban environment, in which this maximisation of space can 
be interpreted as an active reaction to the otherwise overwhelming extension of the 
surrounding space. As Mikhail Epstein has written, “Closeness in Russia is a metaphysical 
fact, standing in direct contradiction to the nation’s physical properties”.74 He describes this 
as being the chief paradox of Russian space, one that is epitomised in the remarkable 
interrelationship between rarefaction and condensation.75 
 Stalinist space, both physically and mentally, dramatically tapped into the mythology of 
the Russian topos. The spatial juxtaposition of absence and presence was semantically 
developed in various cultural channels in the 1930s. Through the homogenisation of the arts, 
the socialist realist principles – the Bolshevik style par excellence – formed a master plot on 
which nearly all narratives, particularly in literature and film, was based on. As Peter Kenez 
writes, “a socialist realist novel is always a Bildungsroman, that is, it is about the acquisition 
of consciousness”. 76  In many of the novels and films, this rite of passage to acquire 
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consciousness was a manifestly spatial transaction. Through a journey from periphery to 
centre, the protagonist(s) can be seen as resolving the temporal imbalance of the Russo-
Soviet space as they are stepping into Moscow, a city in the zenith of time. This Bolshevik 
didactic was not only confined to the realms of fiction, indeed it was analogous to a series 
of spatial rites of passage that were forming a real life metanarrative. The Stakhanovites and 
their Kremlin rituals, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, provide an 
excellent example of this. In their trips to Moscow, they are beckoned to the centre by Stalin 
to undergo their ideological Bildungsroman.  
In order to fully understand these rites of passage and rituals, I feel that is important to 
incorporate theory from social anthropology. As theorists from Van Gennep to Myerhoff 
have pointed out, rituals are structuring mechanisms which dramatically attempt to assign 
meaning both individually and collectively.77 In the process, not only does ritual propagate 
cultural ideas, it also shapes them: “Rituals personalize abstract cultural meanings and turn 
them into comprehensible narratives”.78 The primary function of socialist realism and the 
master plot can be understood through this anthropological optic, as the repository of state 
myth it was used to encode the cultural landscape with a meaningful, standardised narrative. 
The climax of this plot, whether that be in fiction or reality, was a transformation which 
encompassed the acquisition of ‘consciousness’. The vast body of literature on ritual 
identifies the transformational element of the process as a universal component of the act.79 
This stage of the ritual process is a described as the liminal stage, where the ‘liminaires’ are 
betwixt between two states of being; they have already been detached from their old places 
in society, yet they have not completed the transition and cannot re-aggregate. In this liminal 
dimension the ritual subject is a paradox, being both this and that, the experience of 
occupying this threshold – which is removed from time and space –  is akin to a metaphysical 
transcendence.80  
Moscow, the Kremlin, and more specifically Stalin, were the sites for these passage rituals 
in the 1930s. These transitions can be seen in several episodes, I will focus on two specific 
instances: the aforementioned Kremlin rituals, and the Soviet aviators (who will be 
addressed in Chapter Three). Using the theoretical framework outlined in this section, this 
chapter will look at the interrelationship between space, ritual and power and their 
connection to the narrative of the Stalin cult. Section 2.2 will analyse socialist realism in 
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relation to the spatial metanarrative of Stalinism, this will be done through decoding the 
dialectic structure that made up the ‘prototypical plot’ of socialist realism. Section 2.3 will 
study the emergence of the Stakhanovites as representing a “qualitative change in human 
anthropology” and the Stalinist ordering of reality.81 After analysing the ‘real’ Stakhanovite 
movement, I will then use Aleksandrov’s Stakhanovite fairy tale, The Radiant Path, as a 
comparative case study of socialist realism par excellence, demonstrating the complex 
crossover between reality and fiction. In the final part of this chapter, Section 2.4, the revival 
of the Third Rome myth and the historical rehabilitation –  and subsequent Stalinisation – of 
Ivan the Terrible will be explored. Ultimately, analysing the thirties through this myth-based 
metanarrative demonstrates how the synergic marriage of fact and fiction, past and present, 
and centre and periphery, can facilitate a unique mental landscape; the emergence of which 
concomitantly expedited the Stalin cult. 
 
2.2 ‘To Moscow!’: Socialist Realism, Cinema and the Spatial Metanarrative  
 
Moscow will abide to where we tell it to 
The real Moscow is wherever we put it! 
That is – in Moscow. 
– Moscow and Muscovites, Dmitry Prigov  
 
 
The writing of socialist realist literature in the 1930’s was a process safeguarded by a 
specific set of aesthetico-political principles. This was superintended by the Writers’ Union 
which was formed in 1932 on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party after disbanding a number of other literary organizations: RAPP, Proletkult, and 
VOAPP. The Writers’ Union oversaw the monopolisation of socialist realism as the literary 
style par excellence. This was based around a list of archetypal canonised novels that formed 
the skeleton of the movement, containing classics such as Gorky’s Mother and N. 
Ostrovsky’s How the Steel was Tempered. Given its final form at The First Congress of the 
Writers’ Union in 1934, the method was subsequently applied to on the art sphere. 82 
Underpinned by the Marxist-Leninist theory of dialectical and historical materialism, 
socialist realism symbolically recapitulated the stages of historical progress outlined in the 
theory. Using this as a subtext, the basis of what Katerina Clark calls the “master” or 
                                                                                                                          
81  Clark,  Soviet  Novel,  120.  
82  Boris  Groys,  The  Total  Art  of  Stalinism:  Avant-­‐garde,  Aesthetic,  Dictatorship,  and  Beyond  (London:  Verso  
Publications,  2011),  38.  
  
  
34  
  
“prototypical” plot was formed.83 This was structured around a series of temporal, spatial 
and ontological dialectics: centre and periphery, conscious and unconscious, past and present 
or high and low.84  Stalinism positioned itself as the mediator between these extremes, 
functioning as a paradox resolver and purveyor of the mythical order of things. As a result 
of these dialectic resolutions the principal theme of the socialist realist/Stalinist narrative 
became transitionality.  
Stalinist culture declared itself the historical telos toward which all of human history was 
inevitably moving.85 In this motional framework an interesting bifurcation of Stalinism’s 
temporal outlook can be seen. As Keith Livers points out, the “image of ‘socialism achieved’ 
portrayed the present as a limpid mirror of the soon-to-be-realised utopian future”, 
juxtaposed, “the culture’s revolutionary cores hesitation to declare history’s transformative 
project at an end”.86 Stuck between these two narratives, Stalinism in the 1930s can be seen 
as occupying a space outside of normal historical time. Similarly, socialist realism did not 
see itself as conforming to categories of historical temporality, it regarded historical time as 
ended and thus occupied no specific place in it. According to the principles of Marxist-
Leninist theory, it depicted history as an arena of dialectic struggle between the active, 
demiurgic forces which were working towards building a better world and the passive, 
contemplative forces which did not believe in or desire change.  
Thus, the spatiotemporal reality of the 1930s was depicted as a state of liminality: neither 
here nor there. Having detached itself from the past, it occupied a peculiar zone on the 
intersection of the present and the future. In this liminal stage new paradigms emerged which 
represented a dramatic restructuring of reality from horizontal to vertical. In this new 
framework, a revaluation of basic ideals saw the citizens being encouraged to look “not 
alongside, their brothers, but upward to the fathers”.87 In doing so, an idealised rhetoric 
which verged on mysticism dominated the 1930s. Moreover, the dialectic nature of socialist 
realism guaranteed that, in the cultural sphere, this change in axis was organised around a 
series of motifs that had been established by the Writers’ Union and, of course, been 
overseen by Stalin: the final filter and nodal centre.88  
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One of the principal dialectics of the Stalinist metanarrative was the spatial ontology of 
periphery and centre. Many excellent examples of this can be found in Soviet cinema. 
Although it had its origins in literature (as discussed above), socialist realist methodology 
reached its optimal means of conveying ideology in Soviet cinema. In a widely illiterate 
population the visual primacy of the image was an effective means of political persuasion.89 
Socialist realism ensured that the spatial semantics of Stalinism were the key agents in 
producing meaning in films. As Anna Katsnelson points out: “genre emerges as a 
determinant of meaning and hence functions as an agent of overarching strategy to control 
the audience’s reaction by providing the context in which that film must be interpreted”.90 
An example of this controlled reaction can be best seen in the Soviet mass song of the 1930s, 
a medium which combined Soviet folklore with comic cinema. Inasmuch as any musical is 
hyperconscious of the ‘catchiness’ of its content, the potentialities for retransmission are 
manifestly pronounced in a total culture which is actively looking to broadcast their 
ideological doxa through cultural products. The melodic insemination of the spatial 
metanarrative can be found in the “Song of the Volga” taken from Grigori Aleksandrov’s 19 
38 Volga-Volga: 
 
We are moving both the mountains and the rivers, 
The time of fairy tales has come to life, 
And along the Volga, free forever, 
The boats are sailing to Moscow. 
 
Here, the enchanted lyrics invoke a notion that Moscow, Russia’s true centre has awoken. 
The Volga is anatomised as a great network of veins through which the blood is pumped out 
from its heart, Moscow. The song “Our Moscow” describes how when one is away from this 
focal point they continually pine to return, “everywhere we are in our hearts united faraway 
Moscow” as “We are all in our hearts Muscovites”.91 This was part of the collection of 
“songs not about one’s own love”, these universalised the personal feelings of love and 
happiness through the collective paradigm of Moscow.92 Cinema was used to modernise the 
Russian folk song, the lyrical composition of these mass produced songs tapped into the 
spatial mythology contained in Russia folklore. With their subtle ideological undertones, 
they subliminally invite you to the centre, signalling a profound change in the spiritual 
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atmosphere.93 By placing Moscow within the framework of the folkloric pagan body of myth, 
its role as the nucleus of Russia was historically authenticated. This notion is reflected in 
Ivan Pyr’ev’s 1941 film, The Swineherd and the Shepherd. In Pyr’ev’s film, a Stakhanovite 
swineherd receives a trip to Moscow and the Agricultural Exhibit as reward for her record-
breaking labour. There, in “the heart of the Soviet land”, she meets her future husband – a 
shepherd from the Caucasus who is also a glorified labourer.94 However, their encounter is 
not governed by chance, as one mass song puts it “As the rivers meet in the sea, / So do 
people meet in Moscow”.95 Moscow’s mythical centrality was reinforced by a thematic 
portrayal of the capital as a place of spontaneity and occurrence. From the centre a message 
of proximity was transmitted out into the periphery, pursuit of physical proximity to Moscow, 
the Kremlin and Stalin was a rite of passage. Visiting Moscow one might find love, become 
a man (or woman), or even meet Stalin. Ultimately, the idea elucidates that the closer to the 
ideological centre one was, the more they were likely to be raised to a higher level of 
consciousness.  
With his aesthetico-political coup of the arts complete, Stalin now had control over the 
Soviet Union’s virtual, as well as myth its real landscape. Boris Groys points that: “it is of 
course irrelevant to object here that Voroshilov or Kaganovich or Stalin himself were not 
experts on art, for they were in reality creating the only permitted work of art – socialism – 
and they were moreover the only critics of their own work”.96 As the real life authors of the 
socialism, Stalin and his circle were specialists of the only poetics necessary – the demiurgic 
building of the socialist utopia – they had the same legitimacy to give directives on the 
aesthetic composition of a painting as they did to the production of steel. From this 
perspective, it becomes clear why writers, artists and film producers were allowed access to 
the nucleus of Stalinist body politic. Their privileged access was a concomitant condition of 
capturing ‘the typical’, which they were then expected to echo in their work. Thus, the artists 
were given a glimpse at how Stalin and the party leadership actively formed reality, and by 
being afforded this opportunity, they themselves became incumbent in the (re)production of 
this reality. Gerasimov when speaking about the production of Stalin and Voroshilov in the 
Kremlin, spoke about having “the high honour of being at Comrade Stalin’s several times”.97 
Another later example can be found in V.M. Petrov – the director of The Battle of Stalingrad 
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– statements which recount how Stalin’s secretary, Aleksandr Poskryobyshev, allowed him 
into the inner sanctum of the Kremlin, Stalin’s office:  
 
He summoned me to the Kremlin, when Comrade Stalin was not there. I was in Comrade 
Stalin’s office and saw the entire setting of his life and work. These were very moving 
minutes, I had to memorize everything in this room, all the details. I could no longer 
observe for a long time or bother with questions. But I strained my whole memory to 
preserve all separate details.98   
 
By giving the artists propinquity to the environment of the centre, the artists can be seen 
as having a meta-experience of the narrative that they are being summoned to produce. This 
pre-aesthetic experience of the ideological Bildungsroman sees the artist travel to the centre 
to gain an understanding of Stalin and the party, after which they are then able to participate 
in the cultural process of reflecting the reality they perceived. Therefore, the subject of 
artistic mimesis is, as Groys argues, “not external, visible reality, but the inner reality of the 
inner life of the artist, who possesses the ability to identify and fuse with the will of the party 
and Stalin… [and] of the reality that this will is striving to shape.”99 However, not all artists 
were as party orientated as people like Gerasimov, for prominent contemporaries such as 
Platonov, Zoshchenko and Akhmatova’s “desire to be included in Stalin’s quest for the fairy 
tale come true could neither be totally resisted not entirely embraced.”100  
 
2.3 The Radiant Path of Labour: Stakhanovism and the Kremlin Rituals  
We’ll turn everything upside down and throw it out to the devil! We’re going to break 
everything obsolete. 
 –The Radiant Path, Grigori Aleksandrov 
 
“We, contemporaries of the Five-Year Plans”, wrote Viktor Shklovskii in his diary, “see 
how people alter, how peasants, for example, change [my italics]”.101 In the thirties, the 
Stalinist mantra of ‘change’ reverberated around the topos, however, human potential was 
stiffly bracketed within the omnipresent agent of ideological motivation. With the 
emergence of the Stakhanovite movement in 1935, a sustainable narrative of labour and 
mobility as a means of ideological elevation was established. Stakhanovism built on the 
practice of socialist competition and shock work which focused on the maximisation of 
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productivity, this was developed as a means of gaining moral (and material) incentives. 102 
The heroification of prominent workers such as the eponymous Aleksei Stakhanov, saw a 
shift in focus away from the collective to the individual within the overarching heightened 
productivity campaign. Through this crucible labour emerged as rites de passage; a means 
of internal and external ideological mobility. The Stakhanovites were the embodiment of the 
Soviet mythology of labour, their work was portrayed as being unequivocally altruistic and 
part of a higher-order syntheses. Labour as a means of reconfiguration dominated Stalin’s 
speech at the First All-union Conference of Stakhanovites in 1935: “These are new people, 
people of a special type… it [the Stakhanovite movement] contains the seed of the future 
rise in cultural and technical level”.103 For Stalin, the Stakhanovites’ teleological harnessed 
labour represented an abstract resolution in the historical progress of Marxism-Leninism. 
Clark identified this as the dialectic of “Spontaneity” and “Consciousness”, a paradigm 
which was one of the fundamental driving forces of the Leninist version of historical 
progress: 
 
Consciousness’ is taken to mean actions that are controlled, disciplined, and guided by 
politically aware bodies. ‘Spontaneity’, on the other hand means actions are… sporadic, 
uncoordinated, self-centred… The ultimate stage… communism, is reached in a final 
synthesis…or ultimate revolution [that] will result in the triumph of ‘consciousness.104 
 
 
The rhetoric of Stalin’s speech at the Conference of Stakhanovites was diligently geared 
around narrowing the historical agency of Leninist history on the individual human being. 
In this microcosmic historical drama, the individual has the ability to undergo a rite of 
passage by becoming an actor and stepping inside the motional process of history via 
ideologically conscious actions. They stood as an emblem not only in daring and 
achievement, but in epistemology also; among the excessive epithets generated for the 
Stakhanovite, “Prometheus unbound” precisely denotes this.105 Stalin saw the ‘unbound’ 
Stakhanovite movement as “the beginnings of precisely such a rise in the cultural and 
technical level of the working class… which are essential for the transition from socialism 
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to communism and for the elimination of the distinction between mental and manual 
labour”.106  
Throughout the speech Stalin tributes the movement as occurring “somehow of itself, 
almost spontaneously, from below, without any pressure whatsoever”.107 By framing the 
phenomenon as such, Stalin separates the agency of the Stakhanovites from the extreme 
output pressures on the industry set by the centre. However, in this respect, the narrative of 
elevation was symbolised by five-year plans, unattainable demand and the heightened 
tensions between workers, engineers and managers. Emboldened by their new status as 
heroes of production, Stakhanovism gave workers a voice to air grievances. Feeling that the 
regime was on their side, but the local administrators were not, the tone and direction of their 
criticism was stringently aimed at their managers.108 Seeing Stakhanovites such as Evdokiia 
Vinogradova bragging, “I used to earn, 180, 200, 270 rubles a month. But now, when I tend 
144 looms, my earnings are as much as 600 rubles. Just see how much my wages have 
increased!”, other workers felt aggrieved when their administrators did not have the 
resources to facilitate their ‘status transition’.109 This pressure on management was applied 
two-tier as the national leadership also deeply mistrusted them. In a sequence of articles such 
as “They are hindering us from working Stakhanovite fashion”, managerial performance was 
highlighted as hindering the movement.110 One such piece talks about the Kirov Factory 
director who “had all the opportunities, [and] everything necessary, to organize labour at the 
plant… but the director didn’t succeed in doing this. He works the way he worked three 
years ago, when there was no Stakhanovite movement”.111 Stalin echoes these sentiments 
blaming “the old standards of output… our engineers, technical workers and business 
managers drew up certain standards of output adapted to the technological backwardness of 
our working men and women”.112 These ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigms preoccupied Stalinist 
rhetoric in the thirties, in the context of the terror ‘old’ became a synonym for opponent. In 
an industrial context, this meant to be in opposition to the ‘new’ paradigm of Stakhanovism. 
With the Stakhanovites emerging as largely ‘symbolic heroes’ their antithesis came in the 
form of managers and engineers became the ‘symbolic villains’. In Robert Thurston’s 
analysis of the Harvard Project Survey of  2,718 ‘non-returnees’ after the war, he points out 
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that “those in administrative responsibility were twice as likely as their non-administrative 
peers to report having being personally arrested”.113 To fill this vacuum of administrative 
positions during the terror, in many cases, Stakhanovites rose to replace those who had been 
arrested.114 In this regard, the mantra of elevation through labour was given tangible ends, 
however, in the unremitting vacillation of  the terror the inciters often became victims.  
Notably, in 1935-37, as the terror began to become more prominent, the Stalin cult was 
supported by these new hero cults. These cult offshoots made for a mental topography of 
veneration and naturalised the Stalin cult as being ‘from below’, as Plamper points out: 
“Invariably these hero cults were in dialogue with the Stalin cult and entailed what one might 
call sacral-double charge”.115  In a visual analysis of Stalin’s representations, Plamper has 
created a graph charting the number of depictions of Stalin ‘alone’, vs ‘with others’. 
Interestingly, in 1936 with the inauguration of the terror, Stalin appears alone only 15 times 
and appears with others 62 times. This was one of the only years from 1929-1953 where 
such a large visual discrepancy occurs.116 In 1936, Stalin’s patronage to the Stakhanovites 
was a prominent visual trope; photomontages of Stalin depicted as the omnipresent overseer 
of the movement officially and aesthetically highlighting the teleological importance of 
labour (Fig. 4). Through these sub-cults the logic of Stalin’s paradoxical cult of “immodest 
modesty” can be seen, with the “idea of being liked and likeable, of appealing to the masses 
and attracting them, while being different to them”.117 
As Futerfas’s poster suggests, Stakhanovites, and especially Stakhanov himself, were 
depicted as devoted to Stalin. In the mid-thirties rhetoric of remarkable people, their feats 
bore witness to “a qualitative change in human anthropology” which was soon to inseminate 
the mental universe of the land.118 Through their extraordinary labour, the Stakhanovites 
assumed a special place in the mythology of the Stalinist family as ‘sons’ – joined by other 
heroes such as mountain climbers, explorers and, above all, aviators – they were depicted as 
having a special relationship with prominent figures known as ‘fathers’.119 Father figures 
were usually represented by political luminaries like Stalin, or by leaders in their field like 
Maxim Gorky, they served as heuristic models for the sons to take impetus from. ‘Sons’ did 
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not, as one might expect, succeed their ‘fathers’. They had no real political agency; instead, 
they served as figurative harbingers in the Stalinist metanarrative – a formulaic model for 
the population to emulate. Generally, ‘fathers’ were omnipresent, wise figures who had been 
through trials like their ‘sons’, who, on the other hand were depicted as being somewhat 
‘unhinged’ and in need of close tutelage.  Through this new familial network, the 
Stakhanovites were provided with modern apartments and awarded with prizes such as 
motorcycles, bicycles and gramophone players, the likes of which the rest of the Soviet 
public could only dream of owning.120 In many cases, the Stakhanovites transition was 
consummated through an invitation to the centre, where they participated in a ritualised 
award ceremony receiving either the Red Banner of Labour or the Order of Lenin.121  
For the Stakhanovites, these Kremlin rituals were much more than physical transactions 
to acknowledge their feats. These kairotic encounters were said to have been the ex post 
facto (after their feats), sources of the heroes’ ‘knowledge’ or ‘consciousness’.122  In their 
trip to Moscow (and to a larger extent the Kremlin), the Stakhanovites were transitioning to 
a higher order of place. By passing through the sacral omphalos of the Kremlin, which, 
functioned as something of a Jacobs Ladder – connecting the physical world with the super 
terrestrial beings, Lenin and Stalin – the Stakhanovites are inchoately betwixt between two 
spatiotemporal realities.   The situation the Stakhanovite finds himself in fits within the 
broader anthropological schema of the ritual and rite of passage. Arnold Gennep writes about 
the ephemeral effects this has on the individual: “Whoever passes from one to another finds 
himself physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for a certain amount of time: 
he wavers between two worlds”.123 In this liminal state of being, Andrei Stakhanov reported 
that they “did not acknowledge time” during their meeting with Stalin.124 This is because the 
meeting with Stalin was structured in a different temporal ordering separate from the normal 
rubric of reality. This is analogous to the “great time” that Mircea Eliade elucidates in his 
analysis of time and myth: “imitating the exemplary acts of a god or of a mythic hero, or 
simply by recounting their adventures, the man of an archaic society detaches himself from 
profane time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the sacred time”.125  
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Another striking analogy comes from Katerina Clark, who points out the vivid parallels 
between the mythology of High Stalinist mythology and Plato’s myth of the cave.126 
Through the Stalinist system of knowledge, the ‘fathers’ unlike the mortals in Plato’s cave, 
knew of a higher, enlightened ideological reality which exists outside of merely ‘seeing 
appearances’. In the Kremlin rituals, the Stakhanovites get to temporarily be part of this 
cosmology and in the process their transition comes from this acquisition of ‘higher 
knowledge’. In their accounts of the meetings, they typically approach the Kremlin with 
apprehension and are marked by an inability to express oneself.127 When they enter the Great 
Hall of the Kremlin, and Stalin is in visual proximity, they report being dazzled by the 
“blinding” light.128 Andrei Stakhanov found that, “I could not take my eyes off him [Stalin] 
and “felt a great need to get closer to him”.129 In this highly ritualised moment of passage, 
the presence of “Stalin looking down on us with eyes of a father and teacher”, proves to be 
the ubiquitous epiphany of consciousness for the Stakhanovites.130 And thus, as Katerina 
Clark eloquently puts it:  
 
out of the surging elemental darkness the wild, inchoate ‘mustangs’ comes to see the 
‘forms’ in the dazzling Kremlin hall in order that henceforth he may have words to 
express what he has so far only grasped hazily and intuitively. Once he ‘knows, he 
changes from rebel to leader and is reintegrated: he commonly starts studying at some 
institute, and he joins the Party.131  
 
After their audience with Stalin the two great paradoxes are resolved; the spatial 
(periphery/centre) and the temporal (spontaneity/consciousness). Their actions are no longer 
sporadic and self-centred – instead they are working within the temporal framework of the 
party, stepping inside history via ideologically conscious actions. With these two dialectics 
resolved, one saw “differently than ever before”, reported Stakhanovite, A Khovinm.132 In 
these redemptive moments the real and the fictional metanarratives align, creating a complex 
ontological system of power which transcended the jurisdictions of reality. Through a 
comparative analysis of Grigori Aleksandrov’s musical film The Radiant Path, it is possible 
to see just how large an extent these paradigms were oscillating between fiction and reality. 
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     Figure. 5. Genrikh Futerfas, Stalinists! Extend the front of the Stakhanovite movement!’,   
1936.133 
 
At his speech at the First Soviet Writers Congress of 1934, Gorky stressed the importance 
of the socialist realism mimesis to capture labour as art: “We must choose labour as the main 
protagonist… that is a man, organized by the process of labour, which we arm with all the 
might of modern technology, a man who in his turn organises labour to be more productive, 
elevating it to art. We must learn to comprehend labor as art”.134 In The Radiant Path, 
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Gorky’s aesthetic diktat is fully realised in a work which embodies both the art of labour and 
the labour of art. Aleksandrov’s third film in a string of hits under Stalin, sees Stakhanovism 
reconfigured with fairytale-esque pathos. Through the form-conscious prism of the socialist 
realist master plot, Aleksandrov’s film can be seen as a “diligently au courant glossary of 
high Stalinist mythologemes, which in this case included the Stakhanov movement and the 
merriment of upwardly mobile Soviet life”.135 In true hyperbolic fashion, the film  coalesces 
the Soviet mythology of labour with the Cinderella story. The linear plot of the film focuses 
on the notion of becoming: the metamorphosis of Tanya from a simple, illiterate, peasant 
girl to an award winning Stakhanovite shockworker, and finally to an engineer. In the 
process of her transition she finds love in Moscow, and even visits the Kremlin. As the film 
culminates, Tanya the peasant from the periphery is reborn an educated, professional woman 
and a party delegate. Of all Aleksandrov’s musical films, The Radiant Path manifestly fulfils 
the narrative paradigms of socialist realism in which the protagonist goal is to resolve the 
spontaneity and consciousness dichotomy and to overcome a feat in the public sphere. On 
one hand, Tanya’s social mobility through labour sees her reach a state of consciousness, 
and synergistically, her innovate labour which breaks the Stakhanovite record is for the 
benefit of the State.136 
The Radiant Path opens with Tanya mechanically performing her domestic chores with 
the comedy deriving from her quasi-robotic, Chaplinesque aerobics. In this epigonism of 
Chaplin in Modern Times (1936), Tanya’s actions are funny, not only because of their 
slapstick element, but also because using the humour topos, what Tom Gunning has called 
the “machine gag”, Tanya as a human machine embodies an unconscious ignorance. In the 
repository of Soviet labour mythology, Tanya’s aimless labour precisely embodies this 
notion; she is unconsciously disconnected from the building of communism. For her, the 
distinction between mental and physical labour still exits, and through the aesthetic paragon 
of Chaplin (Modern Times ran on screens in Moscow in 1936, and was extremely popular 
with the Party), Aleksandrov gives a comic pathos to the two different states of 
labour/being.137  
After her bourgeois mistress fires her, Tanya is taken under the wing of Party delegate 
Pronina, who sends her to literacy classes, and places her in a textile factory. Despite both 
being female characters, Tanya and Pronina encapsulate the archetypal father and son 
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dialectic of the prototypical plot of socialist realism. In post-revolutionary imagery, there 
was an increased political investment in gender and gendered labour which embodied the 
distinction between the past and present. However, with the pendulum swinging back 
towards a more patriarchal society than the post-revolutionary zeal of the 1920s may have 
hoped for, representations of women were “commandeered as metaphors for an obeisant 
populace, an appropriation indicative of the extreme vacillation in the alignment of gender 
roles in Soviet Russia”.138 Mirroring the binate gender codification in Stalinism, Tanya is 
gender specific; yet gender equal: choosing workman’s overalls to obscure her femininity in 
the factory whilst in other scenes appearing throughout the story in frilly dresses, parasols 
and other such “accoutrements of conventionally constructed and construed 
womanliness”.139 Throughout the film Tanya is accosted by male suitors (including future 
husband Lebedev), but her sexual energy is displaced into the service of the state. Thus, 
labour takes on an erotic corporeality in the film, only when Tanya experiences her distinctly 
secular revelation on how to break the Stakhanovite record does she become lasciviously 
displayed. As she rises from her bed in a rumpled nightgown, she presses her hand into her 
bosom and climatically recites, “The heart beats, beats and will achieve what it desires”, 
which, in the context of socialist realist mythology, is to be Stalin’s champion of labour.140  
As she plans to carry out her feat, the factory director is villainised in true Stalinist vein, 
declaring, “So, you will order walls to be broken on account of her fantasy?”, to which, 
Pronina replies in the true Stalinist lexicon: “We’ll turn everything upside down and throw 
it out to the devil! We’re going to break everything obsolete”. In this rhetoric mimesis, the 
linguistic undertone of denunciation is unequivocally apparent. As the factory wall is broken 
down to provide space for Tanya’s machines, she achieves her record feat and is tossed in 
the air by her comrades. As she flies through the air, she appears in shot under a portrait of 
Stalin, through this visual proximity all her achievements are thus metonymically aligned 
with him. To honour her feat, she is invited to Moscow, and the Kremlin – a journey which 
is adumbrated throughout the film in through symbolic objects and moments such as a 
cigarette case with a view of Moscow embellished on it, or in her dream sequences where 
she visualises a collage of Moscow buildings such as the Kremlin.  During her ritual 
initiation at the Kremlin, Tanya receives her Order of Lenin, however, before she can re-
aggregate back into reality as party delegate – thus completing her ideological 
Bildungsroman – Aleksandrov ups the magical ante with a phantasmagorical sequence.  
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In this transitional scene, Tanya transcends the vectors of chronological reality as she 
stops by an ornate magic mirror in the Kremlin. The mirror retraces her ideological 
development – from a peasant girl, to a factory worker and finally to a record beating 
Stakhanovite – Tanya in her present form stands outside of the process. The scene nods to 
Chernyshevsky’s What Is To Be Done, however, where his novel looks to the future, 
Aleksandrov’s inverts the gaze to the past. Through this entirely retrospective scene, 
Aleksandrov suggests that Chernyshevsky’s future has been achieved.141 To complete her 
transformation Tanya must enter the future and to do so she is led into this magical looking 
glass mirror, not by her ideological mentor Pronina, but by her own hypostatic doppelgänger 
- a would be princess lover. As they enter the mirror together they go into a shiny new flying 
automobile which flies them up into the mountains thus uniting the periphery with the centre 
through the dream of labour. As the car flies through the air Tanya beckons out to the future 
topos: “Hi there, oh land of heroes! A land of dreamers, a land of scholars! / You stretch out, 
immeasurable and boundless, My invincible homeland”. In the course of the flight the two 
Tanya’s (lover and Stakhanovite) merge into one, intimating her self-actualisation as an 
engineer’s people’s deputy and suitor to Lebedev.142  In this scene Tanya’s outfit magically 
morphs from her white dress she wore to the Kremlin ceremony into a dark powerful suit, 
as this happens she simultaneously takes the wheel of the car signifying her new position as 
a leader. Tanya’s liminal journey concludes as she returns to Moscow, the sacred omphalos, 
for the finale of the film.143  As she steers the car towards the All-Union Agricultural 
Exhibition – “another symbolic space metonymic to the ‘fairy tale come true” – the 
spatiotemporal groundings of the sequence switch from future to present as the frosted 
border of the looking glass mirror smashes away.144 Tanya’s Bildungsroman has collapsed 
time; the future now is staged in the present. After giving her public speech and finally 
having resolved her spontaneity and consciousness dialectic, Tanya is at last able to 
romantically love Lebedev – the Stakhanovite, socialist-realist fairy-tale par excellence.  
 
2.4. (Re)writing the Past: The Third Rome Myth and the Cult of Ivan the Terrible   
Two Romes have fallen, Moscow is the third and there will be no fourth  
– Ivan the Terrible, Sergei Eisenstein 
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With its mass song and generic plot devices the thirties cultural narrative actively 
inseminated the metaphysical reawakening of Moscow as the caput mundi. Formulated in 
1514-21 by a monk named Filofei, a long standing myth saw Moscow as the Third Rome - 
the spiritual centre of Christianity after the fall of ‘Old Rome’ and the conquering of 
Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire.145 Although the advent of communism in Russia 
saw the Bolsheviks officially renounce religion, the political transition gave a new relevance 
to the Third Rome myth: “the strident millenarianism of the Bolsheviks”, writes Poe, 
“seemed to be the latest and most radical expression of Russian messianism”146. Under 
Stalin’s ‘Socialism in One Country’ the revival of nationalism saw the parameters of the 
Third Rome myth realign accordingly with his internalising, centralising narrative. In a 
series of decrees in the 1930s, the Bolsheviks denounced the ‘School of Pokrovskii’ for its 
over-zealous condemnation of Russia’s imperial past. 147  In doing so, they created an 
opportunity for Russia’s imperial history to be reconceived with caput mundi mythologeme 
taking on a heightened prominence in the spatial mythology of Stalinism. Stalin levelled 
criticism at Pokrovskii’s “abstract sociological themes” and his failure to recognise 
reactionary figures and polices, which, in comparison to the political climate of the present, 
would have been ‘progressive’ in their own time.148 These criticisms paved the way for the 
introduction for a more static, patriotic history. The final result was the 1938, History of the 
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course, which was commissioned, co-
authored and edited by Stalin.  
In light of this change, historians, writers, and directors alike were encouraged to 
highlight the role of Muscovy in gathering lands under the aegis of what would become the 
Soviet Union.149 The ‘Third Rome’ concept provided Stalin with a nexus whereby he could 
justify his restructuring of space through the historical doxa of the caput mundi. As early as 
1933, before the official attacks on Pokrovskii, the conceptualisation of the ‘Third Rome’ 
mythologeme as part of the Stalinist metanarrative was beginning to germinate. In 
“Moscow”, an article about his never finished film of the same title, Eisenstein evokes 
Filofei’s dictum as the conceptual foundation of his work: “this pronouncement by Filofei 
comes across to us from medieval times through tsarist Muscovy and autocratic Moscow. 
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Moscow as a concept is the concentration of the socialist future of the entire world”.150 For 
Eisenstein, Moscow – the Third Rome, could not be specifically located in a temporal 
context, it existed de facto as a pseudo-religious validation for transgressions past and 
present. This notion was conveyed in his film Ivan the Terrible in 1944, when the Stalinist 
interpretation of ‘Third Rome’ reached its apogee.151 In the film’s opening scene the eternal 
topos of Rus’ is conjured in a song about “the sea, the deep blue-Russian sea”, as the verses 
echo high into the cupola of the Uspenskii cathedral, Ivan IV announces his mission to unify 
the lands of Russia and destroy the internal enemies. The scene climaxes as Ivan consecrates 
his proclamation by reviving the words of Filofei: “Two Romes have fallen, Moscow is the 
third, and there will be no fourth! And for that Third Rome the single master will be I 
ALONE”. The meta-mythology in Ivan the Terrible attempts to create a direct temporal 
thread between Ivan and Stalin, both as the inheritors of this historical claim. However, as 
Poe points out, there is no evidence that Ivan was even aware of Filofei’s doctrine.152 
Nonetheless, such discrepancies were irrelevant to Stalin in a period which saw the 
Stalinisation of Ivan the Terrible.  
Eisenstein’s film was the culmination of a period which saw Stalin create a cult of Ivan 
the Terrible around his own cult. The film was part of a collective push in Soviet historical 
science in 1942 to rehabilitate Ivan as the official agent of progressive centralisation.153 In 
that year alone, Robert Viper’s heroic biography of Ivan was re-issued and Aleksei Tolstoi 
completed a drama on his life.  However, Ivan’s re-emergence can be traced back to the mid-
Thirties, with Mikhail Bulgakov’s short-lived comic play Ivan Vasil’evich, a strange play on 
time-travel which established a temporal link between Ivan and Stalin’s Russia. Despite the 
drama being supressed and the ban coming from a fairly low level, Bulgakov’s attempt to 
enter Ivan IV into the public sphere is notable as it reflected the incipient comparison 
between Ivan and Stalin.154 There is evidence in the early 1930s of Stalin’s critics drawing 
this comparison. According to Issac Deutscher, party opposition in the 1930s referred to 
Stalin as “the Genghiz Khan of the Politbureau [sic], the Asiatic, the New Ivan the 
Terrible”. 155  In 1933, E. H Carr – then working at the British foreign office – drew 
comparisons between Stalin’s secret police, the OGPU, and Ivan’s apparatus of terror, the 
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oprichnina.156  Echoes of Carr’s comparison can be found in a letter to Zhdanov from 
workers of the Kirkov plant in 1935, where Stalin and co where seen as “oppressors of 
everyone expect their oprichniki”.157 These resemblances took on a heightened agency from 
1936 onwards when Stalin’s terror was getting into its stride. Through the analogical prism 
of Ivan’s oprichnina, the potential for a damaging contemporary criticism of Stalin’s terror 
existed. The historical narrative of Ivan IV – the paranoid tyrant who persecuted innocent 
victims – provided an all too clear looking glass on the late 1930s. Therefore, in order to 
avoid suspicion of subversive intent, the historiography of Ivan was gradually revised to 
vindicate his actions. Provided in a manner consistent with the official presentation of events 
of 1936-8, Ivan’s transpicuous motives were framed through the paradigm described by 
Perrie as the “necessary eradication of despicable spies and traitors in a complex web of 
conspiracy”.158 
Stalin used Ivan IV’s transmogrification as historical contingency, through rehabilitating 
Ivan’s extreme violence as necessary and progressive, he attempted to reframe his own 
actions as such. By 1939, the positive spatial image of Ivan as the centraliser began to accrue 
widespread narrative authority as it appeared in the higher education textbook. Ivan. S. V. 
Bakhrushin’s chapter stressed his positive features: “No-one denies the great and strong 
intellect of Ivan IV… In his aspiration to consolidate strong central power… he 
demonstrated far-sightedness”.159 Nor did Bakhrushin avoid the topic of Ivan’s cruelty, in 
fact, it also appeared in a manifestly constructive light. Despite his “great natural cruelty” 
having some “pathological features”, the tsar’s cruelty could be justified as necessary: “Ivan 
Groznyi recognised the necessity of creating a strong state and did not hesitate to take harsh 
measures”. 160  Interestingly, although these rewritings were part of a larger canonical 
campaign in the 1930s to praise the progressive activity of state builders, historians such as 
Maureen Perrie see the specific apologias for the terror via the oprichnina as improvised 
‘history from below’.161 She argues that with no evidence of a deliberate campaign ‘from 
above’, in the late thirties the agency came from individual historians who were 
hypersensitive of the emerging parallel between the boyars under Ivan the Terrible and 
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Stalin’s terror.162 Thus, the push for ‘proof’ of treason against Ivan was in actuality an 
attempt to vindicate Stalin by proxy. Working in the framework of the terror, the ability of 
these historians to defuse the negative primacy of historical analogies gave them a chance to 
remove themselves from the radius of blame. Moreover, the Party leadership must have been 
circumspect in the unfolding Ivan-Stalin dichotomy, above all else they must have 
understood that this had to be a compliment rather than a commendation. 
In 1940 Ivan officially entered the Stalinist lexicon with directives from the Central 
Committee “on the restoration of the true historical image of Ivan IV in Russian history”.163 
However, the main instruments for this restoration were literary and artistic works rather 
than historical ones. As aforementioned, a number of major works on Ivan IV were 
commissioned, with Stalin himself personally intervening in some of their productions. 
There was no attempt to circumvent the terror parallels, rather, as Zhdanov wrote of 
Eisenstein’s film “It was necessary to justify Ivan the Terrible, to show that blood had not 
been split in vain.”164 Tolstoi’s drama reinforces this motif, the validity of the terror is 
justified through the spatial meta-myth of ‘Third Rome’: “the Tsar shouldered the gate and 
carried it... The gate of the Third Rome, that is of the Russian kingdom.”165 Moreover, 
Tolstoi explicitly reconciles mass violence as being incumbent to power: “An autocracy is a 
heavy burden... A lot of things have to be broken-down, it is necessary to cut the living 
flesh". 166  Stalin openly confessed his admiration for Groznyi, the oprichnina and their 
extreme cruelty , yet, in many cases he often criticised Ivan for being “insufficiently 
terrible”. 167  Several accounts from members of his circle corroborate this sentiment: 
Mikoyan recalls that “Stalin said that Ivan Groznyi killed too few boyars”.168 In archival 
transcripts of Tolstoi’s telephone conversation with Stalin regarding the script of his drama, 
Stalin approved of  Groznyi ‘s personality but disliked his “suffering pangs of 
conscience”.169 Similarly, Khrennikov’s diary spoke of how Stalin told Scherbrakov that he 
disliked that “he repented afterwards and begged forgiveness from god”.170  More than 
justifying the terror, these sentiments demonstrate how the cult of Ivan IV reinforced Stalin’s 
violent resolve and emboldened his centralising dogma.  
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Stalin had a new narrative authority over the thirties, through the progressive spatial 
parallels and rhetoric of liquidating those against it, the revised of Ivan historically arched 
the Stalinist spatial metanarrative. Using Ivan’s era as a spatiotemporal mechanism of 
reflection, Stalin obliquely justified his actions in the thirties by oscillating between past and 
present. In doing so, his cult, which was built around the centralisation of space, was 
authenticated through the historical contingency of Ivan the Terrible and the mythology of 
the ‘Third Rome’. The sub-cult of Ivan IV was an apologia for the horrific events of the late 
thirties and by placing his actions in a different temporality Stalin was able to indirectly 
address his critics. The heroification of Ivan in the culture sphere provided a dimension for 
Stalin to modulate his image. As Perrie points out, “the Ivan he wanted to see on stage was 
an analogue of his own self-image as a heroic and far-sighted ruler”.171  
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Chapter Three: The Cosmology of the Red Arctic 
 
 
3.1 ‘Even Higher’: From Centre to Periphery  
We were born that fairytale might become reality. 
To conquer the vastness of space 
Reason gave us steel wings for arms, 
And in the place of a heart they gave us a fiery motor.172 
 
In the dominant spatial model of Stalinism, the super centralisation of space saw the 
centre assimilate the periphery. In this complex relationship with the fringe territories of the 
Soviet topos, Stalin actively sought to revolutionise space in rhetoric and reality. After the 
revolution, the Bolsheviks inherited not only a vast, almost uncontrollable empire, but also 
a complex cultural mythology of territory.173 With the epoch of Stalinism, marked by the 
First Five-Year Plan, there was an urgency to ideologically regulate this unbounded, 
ungraspable space. In cultural terms, there was a deliberate attempt to align the unofficial 
and official topography of the Soviet Union through the replication of the socialist realist 
mythology. The key narratives utilised in creation of the centre also functioned on a sub-
level, helping the spatial metanarrative of the Stalin cult dominate all of Soviet space. The 
thirties saw Stalin take on Russia’s vast expanses in an epic battle with nature, a force which 
embodied the “inertia and sluggishness of the country, a burden of its history”.174 This battle 
worked in conjunction with the centrality schema adding weight to the developing narrative. 
Explored using the same blueprint of paradigms, the Stalinist dialogue with nature broadened 
the Soviet body of myth. The same thematic constructs: rite of passage, domination of space 
and patriarchal family structures – were again the principal modes of navigation within the 
nature motif.  
The Stalinist discourse with nature was best characterised by the title of the Soviet 
classroom song “Even Higher”. 175  In this song the worlds of reality and fantasy are 
interwoven in an attempt to push the Soviet utopia into the stratosphere. This mentality was 
a result of the departure from the positivism that dominated the 1920s, an inversion of 
logistical principles shifting the axis from rational to irrational. Vladimir Papernyi defines 
the ordering of reality as having changed from “horizontal structures” to “vertical” ones.176 
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As a result, the gaze of the Soviet man was reconfiguring upwards to political leaders such 
as Stalin or heroes such as Stakhanov, instead of along to his fellow peers. This reorientation 
elicited the start of a fantastical thought climate, one which was concerned with the pursuit 
of fairy tale feats. Nature was the chosen arena for these feats; here the Soviet man could 
become the heroic protagonist of the state story. By attempting to colonise Mother Nature 
through epic expeditions in the Soviet periphery, Stalin looked to overcome the innate spatial 
anxiety provoked by the infinite Russian landscape. The ability to exercise control over 
Russia’s oldest foe would be nothing short of remarkable, as Gill points out “what was 
symbolically significant about the transformation of nature was the claim that it was being 
tamed and put to work in service of the regime’s political end”.177 The Soviet Union’s 
conquest of nature is an important window into the temperament of the period; through this 
paradigm it is possible to see how the fantastical landscape rhetoric naturalised the Stalin 
cult.  
In this chapter the spatial metanarrative of Stalinism will be considered through the lens 
of the Arctic myth. It is perhaps this dialogue that best posits the complex collision of worlds 
in Stalin’s USSR. On one hand, the attempt to civilise the frozen peripheral spaces and tame 
Mother Russia can be seen as an extension of the scientific conquest of unenlightened spaces. 
However, the fantastical rhetoric with which this was pursued completely undermined the 
principle and created a social climate that was diametrically opposed to the ideals of 
Marxism. Through this prism one can see how this idiosyncratic sphere of thought shaped 
an infrastructure for the Stalin cult. In his biography of Stalin, Robert Service summates this 
notion calling Stalin Russia’s ‘Modernities Sorcerer’, a term that nicely aligns the two modes 
of reality.178 I will look to explore these two modes of reality by analysing the rhetorical 
nature of the Arctic expeditions. Firstly, I will look at how the character of the Arctic was 
transformed under the spatial model of Stalinism. Thereafter, I will analyse the pantheon of 
Arctic heroes, paying particular attention to the Arctic aviator, who was seen as the 
paradigmatic new man and an embodiment of the socialist realist worldview. In doing so, 
this chapter will show how the Stalinist body of myth and cultural metanarrative was not 
only able to exist in in the extreme periphery, but also instrumentalise it to benefit the cult.    
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3.2. ‘On Top of the World’: Colonising the Arctic in Rhetoric and Reality  
In the darkness of the polar night, the sun of human intellect now shines brightly. 
– Maxim Gorky 
 
On July 28th 1932, Otto Schmidt and Vladimir Vize set-off on ambitious three-and-a-half-
month traversal of Russia’s Northern coast in their ice-breaking ship the Sibiriakov. Not only 
did the resulting voyage see Schmidt and his company travel over 2,500 miles in uncharted 
Arctic seas, but it irrecoverably transformed the Soviet Union’s dialogue with the North. As 
Schmidt and co returned to Moscow as masters of the Northern periphery, the Arctic took 
on a decidedly mythic, deeply Stalinist oeuvre. The Sibiriakov expedition was markedly the 
first of this nature and it engendered the epoch of the Red Arctic. In just under a decade, the 
Arctic bore witness to a series of remarkable expeditions – The Cheliuskin epic (1933-4), 
SP-1 and the North Pole Landing (1937-8), the long-distance flights (1936-8) – which to this 
day remain prominent moments in the history of the Soviet Union.179 Indeed, in the thirties 
the image of the Soviet Arctic was a larger-than-life epic, an epic which had genuine popular 
appeal. By all indicators, from the thousands of unsolicited, unaltered letters sent by the 
Soviet citizens to Glavsevmorput (the official Arctic institution) or the heroes themselves, 
to the avidly consumed popular culture that it sprang, “ordinary Soviet citizens found Arctic 
heroes to be admirable and the Arctic myth to be more exciting than most Stalinist 
propaganda efforts”.180 After visiting the Arctic, a similar sentiment lead British author 
Harry Smolka to describe the Soviet Union as being “wholly occupied with itself at present” 
and a place whose “youngsters do not dream of battles against men, but of battles against 
nature”.181 By gazing into the icy glaciers of the Soviet Arctic, it is possible to see a unique 
reflection of the Stalinist worldview: how the Soviets viewed the natural world, how they 
engaged with it, and the role it had in creating a cultural bridge between the individual and 
the state. 
The conceptual origins of the Soviet Arctic myth can be traced back to the 1920s. From 
the beginning, a strong measure of antipathy coloured the Russo-Soviet attitudes towards its 
northern topos. Having inverted Frederick Jackson’s famous ‘Frontier Hypothesis’, Georgy 
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Plekhanov, one of the founders of Russian Marxism, concluded that the forces of nature had 
frozen Russia into a perpetual state of stagnation.182 In his introduction to his encompassing 
history of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky reaffirmed Plekhanov’s hypothesis verbatim: 
“The population of Russia’s gigantic and austere plain open to eastern winds and Asiatic 
migrations, was condemned by Nature itself to a long backwardness”.183 In the context of 
Marxism, for a revolution to be truly revolutionary, society must have its world-picture 
transformed, social and national space re-envisaged, and the relationship between the 
individual and space reshaped. 184 Once the post-revolutionary dust had settled in the 1920s, 
the Bolsheviks were faced with the urgent task of reimaging the spatial poetics of the 
landscape. In Soviet Russia, with its vast, amorphous topography, there was an anxiety that 
if space itself was not energised, it may, to paraphrase Plekhanov, condemn the revolution 
into stagnation. Thus, in this early Soviet period, the krugozor (horizon) assumed a new 
ideological significance. As Emma Widdis writes, “as the limit of visible space, the horizon 
was a point of focus, toward which to strive”. 185 Just as the Bolsheviks had overcome history; 
they would overcome space. Mikhail Bakhtin suggested that the crosshairs of the spatial 
conquest were aimed at the horizon because “the age and the masses demand[ed] a new 
range, very distant or very close, just not medium-range, not domestic”.186 
 The Soviet Union opted for the very distant and they embarked on a penetrating period 
of spatial exploration, what Katerina Clark has called a “dash to the periphery”.187 This dash 
saw the Soviet make footholds in the North in the late twenties and into the early thirties. 
The screening and engagement with the territory was characterised in terms of exploration 
rather than exploitation.188 However, as the Five-Year Plans were rolled out, the ideological 
significance of the Arctic transformed from a place of exploration to a place of conquest. 
The quest for information became one for control. This switch was symptomatic of the 
shifting in spatial aesthetics from horizontal to vertical. Osvoenie, the mastery or conquest 
of space, is the term frequently used to describe the Stalinist spatial model and it is perhaps 
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the one that best reflects its aggressive nature.189 From 1932, osvoenie came to define the 
imperialistic spatial strategy toward its Northern periphery. The Arctic was the perfect 
manifestation of the Stalinist spatial conquest. Here, there was no need for spatial 
purification; this northern frontier was a tabula rasa, a landscape void of any spatiotemporal 
lineage, it was as one historian described it “a mirror for the habitual”.190  More than this, it 
was the most extreme topography that would elicit the most extreme exploits, if Stalin could 
bring the Soviet lifestyle to the wild snow dunes of the Arctic he could modernise anywhere. 
In the conquest of the Arctic it is possible to view a transposition of the centre/periphery 
paradigm; in this narrative the journey to the centre is inverted with the new celestial journey 
being out from the centre into the extreme periphery – on a civilising mission. 
It was the sentiment of osvoenie that coloured the aesthetic of the Arctic myth, depicting 
it as a battleground rather than a landscape. The Arctic was a formidable enemy, personified 
by Stalinist discourse as a tangible, anthropomorphic opponent.191 Dwelling in the outermost 
region of the Soviet’s mythical wilderness, on the very edge of the earth, the Arctic was the 
crowning campaign of the Soviet’s great “struggle against the elements”.192 Struggle was 
termed in militaristic rhetoric, fought by the “army of polar explorers (armiia poliarnikov)” 
on the “Arctic Front.”193 This synergic fusion of the martial and adventure lexicon makes 
the Soviet Union’s Arctic rhetoric comparable to colonial discourse. This is particularly 
salient in the case of The North Pole, one of the topographical protagonists of the Arctic 
myth. An enduring symbol in the mental universe of Western civilisation, the North Pole 
like other remote or exotic locales – the Indies, the source of the Nile or the peaks of the 
Himalayas – was mythologised through its aura of unattainability. As the last blank spot of 
the map, the pole was “the epitome of inaccessibility”: earth’s final and most jealously 
guarded secret.194 Additionally, it was imagined both literally and figuratively as the top of 
the world, mastery over it amounted to being on the highest of the high grounds, strategic or 
sacred. In the Soviet discourse, the occidental human ‘Other’ is supplanted by nature as the 
principal obstacle for the coloniser with the North Pole being villainised as the evil “Tsar of 
the North’s” icy stronghold.195 The state sponsored pseudo-folklore of the North Pole as the 
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Arctic’s elusive “polar citadel” was juxtaposed by a scientific lexis of demystification.196 In 
the introduction to his Pravda article, journalist Lazar Brontman, who accompanied the SP-
1 expedition to set up an outpost at the North Pole writes: “The central Arctic remained, as 
before, merely a white spot in science as in geography. The Soviet explorers were the first 
to solve its mysteries and wipe the white spot from the map of the earth.”197  
Unlike the American Robert Peary, who devoted 23 years planning to go to the North 
Pole to stay for just 30 hours, Otto Schmidt writes in the foreword to Brontman’s book: “The 
idea of merely visiting the Pole or flying across it did not satisfy us. We wanted to settle at 
the Pole, to study the Central Arctic Basin thoroughly, to render it habitable”.198 With its 
new technological and scientific abilities, the Soviets aimed to do much more than merely 
make the ‘white spots’ disappear. When leaving the group, Brontman wonders what Schmidt 
is thinking about, and in line with the notion of osvoenie he writes:  
 
No doubt he was reflecting from here, from the North Pole, a dozen Polar stations would 
arise, created by his efforts, on the island and coats of the Polar Basin… The whole map 
of the Arctic would be criss-crossed by the routes travelled by this man, whose cold, deep, 
analytical mind is lined with the ardent heart of a conqueror and a Bolshevik.199  
 
SP-1 was a success, Schmidt and co. drifted over 2000 kilometres from the North Pole to the 
south latitudes of the Greenland Sea. In the process, amongst other studies, they made 
scientific enquires into the weather, currents, ice, and depth of the polar Basin; moreover 
through finding birds, bears and plankton they disproved assumptions that no life existed in 
the Polar Regions.200 Having conquered the ‘polar citadel’, there was an unmistakable link 
between the Arctic and the words of Stalin himself: “There are no fortresses which the 
Bolsheviks cannot capture”.201 Such hyperbolic depictions of the Arctic allowed for any 
victory over it to be represented in a similar vein. For example, one headline celebrating the 
SP-1 Expedition boasted, “we have conquered time and space!”.202 After the Cheliuskinites 
were rescued by air, Izvesttia proclaimed that “technology has conquered nature, man has 
conquered death”.203 This kind of language was indicative of the psychological landscape of 
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Stalinism, the continual leap between reality and fantasy in such exaggerated binaries created 
a radical, illusionary environment of thought. Not only had Stalin conquered ‘time and 
space’, but through the repository of the Arctic the power of Stalin’s socialist vision reached 
its apogee, claiming to have overcome the curse of the Russian prostor, and by extension 
‘death’ itself .204  
The Soviet Union used the blank canvas of the Arctic snow to draw out their own terms, 
own ideology and even their own cosmology. In the Glasevmorput’s network of remote 
towns and polar stations which were seen as “foreposts of Soviet civilisation”, the Soviets 
kept with the centralised Moscow schema, citizens of the Red Arctic were on Moscow clock 
time – a remarkable show of ideological resilience in the battle against nature.205 When a 
reporter from the London Times visited one Arctic commune, he asked the community why 
they chose to operate on Moscow time: 
 
“Never mind the sun, comrade. If we took any notice of it, we should not be living here 
after all. We cannot accept the moods of the Arctic. After all, it’s we who are the bosses 
here.” So that was the law in Igarka! Men decided to live here and they are bending Nature 
to their command. They do not even abide by the mills of time!206 
 
This report is an example of the Stalinist rhetoric of conquest actualised – language such as 
‘bosses’ and ‘command’ show the colonising attitude towards nature had diffused down to 
citizen level. However, it was not just Moscow time that these Soviet Arctic outposts 
managed to adhere to. One of the key narratives of the Arctic myth was that no matter how 
extreme the conditions on this frozen tundra, light from the beacon of Moscow would 
ultimately penetrate the darkness. In the Benthamesque ordering of space, the Kremlin acts 
as the immobile dominant centre – a panoptic viewing point from which the whole territory 
could metaphorically be ‘seen’ and hence controlled: “Stalin, mythically, wrote through the 
night at his desk, a light glowing at his window, the epicentre of Soviet space”.207 This 
civilising light was manifested in the modes of daily living with these polar communities 
having top-of-the-range facilities and home comforts. According to the official Soviet line, 
between 1935 and 1936, Soviet polar stations were apparently provided with the following: 
430,000 roubles’ worth of books, 175,000 roubles’ worth of bikes, and 550,000 worth of 
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sport equipment, ten pianos and enough trumpets and horns for five full brass bands.208  More 
importantly, by 1937, Glavsevmorput were spending around 1.5 million on schools for the 
2,176 children living in or near polar stations.209 The conditions in these ‘outposts of Soviet 
culture’ bore no resemblance to the fantastic images conjured up by the Soviet propaganda 
machine. As Soviet explorer Ernst Krenkel commented, “no one had any particular desire to 
go to the Arctic in those years”.210 In fact, much of the Glavsevmorput budget went on 
monetary incentives for the Arctic worker; in 1933, there was a 150 percent wage increase 
for personnel working above the 55 parallel.211  
In these figures and in the itinerary of miscellaneous items sent from Moscow it is 
possible to see the extent of the USSR’s attempts to super centralise the Arctic. As much as 
the snowscapes of the Northern topos stood out in direct contrast to Moscow, they were part 
of the all-encompassing Stalinist spatial program to connect every point, every place in the 
Soviet cosmos into a unified, homogenised totality. Although Soviet information such as the 
‘175,000 roubles’ worth of books sent to these outposts give a tangible insight into their 
pursuit of civility, it is in the realms of the abstract that one can best comprehend the true 
reach of Stalin and Moscow. Through examining the behavioural modes of the settlers in 
this frozen wilderness it is possible to see just how far reaching the ritualised routines of 
Moscow really were. The citizens of these communities faithfully participated in the 
ceremonialism of the Stalin cult despite being hundreds of miles away from the realities of 
Soviet life. All the niceties of the modern Soviet calendar were celebrated, from May Day 
to the Stalinist Constitution Day, with as much grandiose as the circumstances would 
allow.212 Through the modern apparatus of the radio and ‘wireless operator’ they were able 
to follow events from the mainland, participating in the ritual behaviour of the Stalinist 
period: following show trials, Soviet elections and sports events. Thanks to the uninterrupted 
flow of information, the synchronicity of Stalinist life seemed to be maintained all over 
Soviet space. Brontman’s romantic account of his communication with Moscow typifies the 
spatial lexicon of the Arctic myth, with the voice of socialism emanating from Moscow 
across the prostor: “For the first time the North Pole spoke to Moscow. A human voice 
carried across the wild open spaces which only a few days before had seemed inaccessible; 
and across the Arctic Ocean, over sea, tundra, and the forests of the North, Moscow 
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answered.” 213  Thus, despite living in environmental adversity far removed from the 
proximity of the Soviet domestic sphere, these settlers could still participate in the creation 
of a particular topography of thought.  
Indeed, in true fashion of the Stalin cult, during expedition SP-1, the crew sent a letter to 
Pravda via wireless, declaring: “We should like the Soviet government to name our drifting 
station on the North Pole after Comrade Stalin”.214 This was one of several instances where 
Stalin’s name was attached to the heroic feats of the Arctic conquest, other examples such 
as the ‘Stalin Route’ and the ‘Stalin Path’ publicly underscored his prominence in the myth-
making of the Arctic. However, his namesake was only a small part of his association to the 
myth. He was depicted as something of a mystical muse, who, from his office in the Kremlin 
was able to transcend the physical world and inspire the explorers. During the one expedition, 
Papanin and his crew gathered round the radio to listen to their leader’s address. An article 
reporting this event aptly named “Warmed by Stalin-like Care” read: 
 
Yesterday evening there was the extraordinary picture of a meeting of the thirty members 
of the leading unit of the expedition on the ice at the pole, listening to the reading of a 
telegram of greetings from the leaders of the Party and government. They gathered under 
the open ski, in a snowstorm, but felt no cold because the bright words and the anxious 
care of the great Stalin warmed them and they sensed the glowing of their beloved 
homeland.215 
 
Radiating from the centre, his all-pervasive presence in the Arctic rhetorically emboldened 
the status of his cult. It was the force of his personality and his genius that animated the 
Soviet presence in the Arctic; Stalin’s name and image were “inextricably woven into the 
narrative history of every heroic episode that took place”.216 He was able to transcend the 
age old enemy of the Russian periphery, doing so in the most spectacular arena of all, the 
Arctic.  
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3.3. Icarus of the North: Stalin and the Arctic Aviators   
Andrea: As it is said, “Unhappy is the land that breeds no heroes.” 
Galileo: No, Andrea: “Unhappy is the land that needs such heroes”  
– Berlot Brecht 
 
“There he sat”, wrote Englishman H.P Smolka in his account of his flight with Grazianski 
– one of the Soviet Union/Stalin’s most beloved pilots – “enjoying every minute of his 
triumph over the air and looking for all the world like the symbolic poster displayed to Soviet 
youth today as its ideal: ‘Knight of the Sky’”.217 Smolka goes on to wonder if Grazianski too 
“had already sacrificed the naivety common of the best type of Russian young men to the 
spoiling consciousness of belonging to the country’s modern stardom”.218 In the late thirties, 
Grazianski, along with his fellow aviators took on a leading place in the Soviet pantheon of 
heroes. Much like the Stakhanovites they were held up as the archetypal Homo Sovietcus, in 
the encoded socialist realist aesthetic they configured as ‘sons’ in the metanarrative. 
However, whereas the Stakhanovites can by and large be seen as narrative cogs in the hero 
master plot, the polar explorers, particularly the pilots took this paradigm to a different level. 
From them an entire iconography of aviation and polar exploration came into being. From 
the mid-to late thirties “polar explorers and Arctic pilots became subjects of innumerable 
books, films, radio broadcasts; and inspired a multitude of poems, plays, and other artistic 
works”.219 Sharing a space on all sorts of cultural ephemera alongside Stalin, this symbiosis 
heightened this cult status. For example, the sixty-two world record flights record by the 
aviators, were down to the people of the Soviet Union, but more specially, “Comrade Stalin, 
who teaches, trains, heartens and lead us to victory”.220  In an age when progress was 
measured by new records, these Arctic heroes encapsulated the Stalinist mantra: ‘higher, 
faster, further’.221   
The Arctic and its heroes had a podium position in the grand pageant of High-Stalinism, 
a tabula rasa inseminated with the cultural ethos of socialist realism; it became an unrivalled 
source of Soviet myth-making. Socialist realism portrayed what should be in the rhetoric of 
what actually was and as the difference between fact and fiction became hazy, heroism fed 
the symbiosis. Bold epics and adventures became the cornerstone of cultural Stalinism in the 
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thirties. These real and fiction heroics represented teleological progress of socialism, by 
conquering the Arctic they were fulfilling the words of Karl Marx who wrote that “in 
changing nature, man changes himself”.222 The icy dunes of the Arctic periphery acted as a 
testing ground, a crucible in which national character was sculpted. In the ritualised 
environment of the Soviet Union, and in the lexicon of socialist realism, each expedition to 
the Arctic became a trial. For a hero to become heroic in Stalinist oeuvre, the trials were 
markedly internal and external. As previously mentioned Clark equates the ideological 
Bildungsroman to the dialectic synthesis of the spontaneous and conscious elements of the 
positive hero.223 Very much in the vein of Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian’ and ‘Apollonian’ forces, 
the hero had to tame his nebulous blend of wild courage and raw skill with a maturity and 
control. In the developing mythology of the Soviet Arctic these paradigms were dependably 
replicated, the polar celebrities were depicted as models of this heroic synthesis.  
Vasilii Molokov, one of the chief Soviet pilots, was an ideal embodiment of this mature 
heroism. Known as ‘Uncle Vasya’, he became the paragon of modesty and self-control in 
the Arctic myth. Having recused more people than any other pilot during the Chelyuskin 
expedition, he insisted “I have fulfilled my duty, nothing more”.224 Undoubtedly heroic, he 
eschewed hubristic adventure in favour of training and sagacity: “People say that Soviet 
pilots gamble with death. But if we play a game with death, it is based on carefully calculated 
odds. We study our own strength and that of the Arctic – and only then do we fly”225. 
Similarly, for the Soviet hagiographers, Otto Schmidt represented the eclectic amalgam of 
the positive hero. The head of the Glavsevmorput, he was the organiser, spokesman and 
leader of the Red Arctic. Throughout the thirties, his superlative courage was the structuring 
force behind the flurry of scientific enquiry into the region. His heroic spark was 
synergistically joined with erudition, composure and an altruistic dedication to the Soviet 
cause. Schmidt’s rhetoric itself encompassed the principles of the socialist realist hero: “We 
do not chase after records (although we break not a few upon the way). We do not look for 
adventure (although we experience them every step). Our goal is to study the North for the 
good of the entire USSR”.226  Like Stalin himself, Schmidt had a certain aura, as one 
contemporary said of him, “[Schmidt] only had to enter a room for everyone to immediately 
feel that this man knew everything, understood everything, and could do everything”.227 His 
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ubiquity with the Arctic saw him mythologised as “Grandfather Frost” and in the socialist 
realist model of the ‘great family’, Schmidt shared a lectern with Stalin as the fatherly voice 
of the people. In a cultural context, Schmidt appears as something of a ‘regional replication’ 
of Stalin as the symbolic super father of Soviet space. Nonetheless, Schmidt’s status was 
dwarfed by Stalin, who was at the apex of this familial pyramid as the ‘Father of Nations’. 
As Brontman observes during the SP-1 expedition, Papanin and Schmidt toast Stalin, “who 
raised our people, every one of us, out of poverty and subjection”.228 Without the inspiration 
and guidance from Stalin, the fulfilment of such heroic tasks would not have been possible. 
As the SP-1 expedition culminated, Schmidt promoted three cheers for Comrade Stalin; for 
the man who “teaches, trains, heartens and leads us to victory”.229  
Of all the Arctic heroes Stalin had a particularly special bond with the aviators. Known 
as ‘Stalin’s Falcon’s’, the thematic kinship nexus was fully articulated as they became 
Stalin’s “surrogate children”.230 Stalin was not only their nurturing father but also their 
mentor; he tempered their nebulous blend of heroic energy and helped to resolve their 
spontaneity and consciousness dialectic. Of all the “fledging children of Stalin”, as the fliers 
were often titled, Valery Chkalov was portrayed as the eldest and greatest loved in the family. 
No individual personified the untampered spark of spontaneous heroism more conspicuously 
than Chkalov, whose antics and boisterousness were legendary. For example, in one of many 
instances, when asked why he preferred the single engine ANT-25 aircraft over the 
apparently safer four engine ANT-6, his blithe reply embodies the Dionysian spirit: “Why 
bother with four engines? That’s just four times the risk of failure!” 231  Like Andrei 
Stakhanov, whose initial torrent of heroic energy was depicted as an antiauthoritarian 
reaction to old norms of the managers, one panegyric said of Chkalov: “limited and 
malicious people tried to force him into dead end norms, of limits to the possible… 
nevertheless he – true Soviet man that he was – shattered all these impediments”.232 As he 
entered the public sphere, Stalin took great interest in rearing the ruthless Chkalov; he 
presided over the progress of the young aviator with great solicitude. In one renowned 
episode, Stalin openly chastised Chkalov after learning that he flew without a parachute. 
After protesting that a parachute would be at odds with his training to save his life and the 
costly aeroplane at the same time, Stalin paternalistic told him: “your life is more important 
to me, to the Soviet people, than any machine, no matter how costly. You absolutely must 
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carry a parachute”.233 On another occasion in 1936, seized with the extemporaneous urge to 
fly to the North Pole, Chkalov went to the Kremlin to seek Stalin’s approval. Upon receiving 
him, Stalin bestowed his fatherly wisdom upon Chkalov, ordering him to be more cautious. 
As Chkalov recalled in Izvestiia two years later: “Joseph Vissarionovich listened to us in 
silence, then began to criticize our plan. He spoke in a whisper, but his words were firm and 
decisive… why such risk without reason? You need practice first”.234 And practice he did, 
flying south east to Udd Island – since known as Chkalov Island – on Stalin’s directive.  
Any attempt to break records was often made on the direct orders of Stalin himself. Even 
the smaller details, such as the choosing of equipment, was mediated through Stalin. 
Famously on the eve of Chkalov’s Arctic flight of 1936 he was summoned to the Kremlin 
to meet with Stalin, who suggested changing the entire route of their flight. They did not 
protest. This flight path was later christened the ‘Stalin Route’. These flights into the Arctic 
were of a highly ritual nature, they configured as a sort of trial by the elements. In the 
allegorical fashion of the Homeric theme of nostos (return home), the flights are 
microcosmic national epics which form Soviet consciousness. In their voyage, the aviators 
hope to prove their worth as a ‘son’, the subsequent tribulations they encounter enables the 
heroes to become heroic. In between the departure and the return, the Arctic pilots and 
explorers, can be seen as being in a liminal state, undergoing a dramatically formative 
process. A stock episode during these ritual moments would be the notion of Stalin or 
Moscow giving the hero strength as they faced the elements. As Chkalov wrote, when flying, 
“we Soviet pilots all feel his [Stalin] loving, attentive fatherly eyes upon us”.235 Similarly, 
in a poem penned by Perets Markish in 1937, the record breaking ‘Stalin Path’ transpolar 
flight is reimaged through the eyes of Chkalov and his crew. During a particularly fearful 
moment during the flight the crew seemingly evoke some sort of prayer to Stalin: 
 
Their lips quietly whispered: 
“Leader and Friend, guide us from afar! 
Against these Storms and Winds, 
Above these deserts of eternal ice”.236 
 
Through their engagement with the peripheral portal of the Arctic they became “guardians 
of the threshold”.237 They were the physical intermediators who enacted the Soviet’s battle. 
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Although the flights were not of a wholly political nature they did sustain the sacralised 
political schema put forth by Stalin that, “We Bolsheviks are of a special make up… It is not 
given to every man to be a member of such a party. Not every man could withstand the 
storms.”238 Guiding the pilots through these storms was Stalin. In Our Father, an essay by 
Chkalov, he wrote of Stalin: “He is our father. He teaches us and rears us. We are dear to his 
heart as his own children”.239 Veneration from the Arctic heroes, the biggest of all the Soviet 
celebrities, further sacralised the central image of Stalin as the all-knowing compassionate 
father. 
From the extreme periphery the Soviet pilots would return full circle to Moscow. As 
Schlögel writes, “the arrival in Moscow was merely the finale, the climax of the return home 
from the frontier, from an adventurous voyage of discovery to the ends of the known world, 
back to the centre of power and attention”.240  Waiting in the centre would be their eternal 
father, Stalin. This public reunion was another stock episode in the metanarrative of the 
Arctic myth. For example, on their return from an Arctic expedition the crew of the 
Chelyuskin were personally greeted by Stalin.241  Moreover, when Valerii Chkalov and 
Georgii Baidukov flew to the Soviet Far East in record time, they were greeted with a 
fatherly kiss, with Pravda reporting, “It was Stalin who raised these brave men”.242 Similar 
to the Stakhanovites, when they returned they were invited to the Kremlin to complete their 
process of passage. It is in this moment that the Soviet’s battle with the periphery is resolved 
– after his Kremlin reception Chkalov reported: “the content of my life became richer; I 
began to fly with greater discipline than ever before”.243 In these kairotic moments, when 
father and son are reunited, it is possible to see a perfect harmony in the circular Stalinist 
metanarrative. In many ways, these singular moments came to epitomise the atmosphere of 
Stalinism. Stalin’s heroes were key functionaries in the conceptual framework of the cult. 
Anthropologists such as Victor Turner posit that to understand the values of a particular 
society, it is essential to look at its rituals.244 The ritual process of the 1930’s Soviet Union 
elicit that at the deepest level the values of the Soviet citizens were tied up in the landscape. 
Stalin utilised the landscape, weaving it into his fantastical narrative of heroes and hierarchy. 
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These cultic rituals whilst engaging with and captivating the populace, simultaneously 
reaffirmed the binary of unequal power relations between Stalin’s peers and the rest of the 
USSR.245 The further Stalin placed himself at the epicentre of this heroic narrative; the 
further reality was blurred. 
It is through the prism of the Arctic myth that one is able to understand the particular 
climate of thought that was able to facilitate the Stalin cult. The rhetoric of Stalinism elicited 
the new Soviet man to engage in the wondrous state conquest, and in turn climb the newly 
reordered vertical social ladder. When great feats were accomplished they were portrayed as 
being representative of society, with the collective becoming individualised. The Soviet 
Arctic myth was instrumental in creating a landscape of heroism, one in which all citizens 
of the USSR were encouraged to gaze upwards and become a Chkalov or a Stakhanovite 
(Fig. 5). “If Stalin was the father of the Arctic heroes” writes McCannon, “the narod, the 
Soviet nation, was their extended family”.246 This rhetorical framework associated Stalin 
and the Arctic heroes with the population as a whole. As Brontman writes, the polar 
explorers and birds of steel in the sky were “sent out by our great Soviet country”, the success 
of the Arctic conquest was because of the “victory of the country’s single will”.247 In the 
socialist realist model the spoils of heroism diffused down amongst the Soviet people, who 
were unified, high and low, in the “Stalinist tribe”. In this developing metanarrative of daring 
heroes and dangerous feats, there was a central name woven into the story, Stalin. The Arctic 
conquest actively reinforced the thematic constructs of Stalin’s image by using the structural 
dialectics of the Soviet myth body. In doing so, it solidified the key depictions of Stalin as a 
leader: the immovable centre, the conqueror of the periphery, the father of the Soviet family, 
all of which were crucial pillars of veneration which upheld the cult. 
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Figure. 6. Aleksandr Deineka, Future Pilots, 1937.248 
 
3.4 The Fall of Icarus: Trouble in the Tundra  
But it stank, too, even way up north, beneath the Arctic storms, at the polar stations so 
beloved in the legends of the thirties.                                                                   
                                                               – The Gulag Archipelago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. 
 
On December 15th 1938, Chkalov died while flying a prototype of the Polikarpov I-180 
on its maiden voyage. Deeply saddened by the death of his ‘eldest son’, Stalin prepared a 
funeral for him which would be worthy of the highest dignitary. His body lay in the Hall of 
Columns as thousands upon thousands of mourners paid their respect. At the funeral Stalin 
himself was a pallbearer, metaphorically extending their relationship from cradle to grave.249 
Like Icarus, it seems that Chkalov had flown too close to the sun: some believed he had died 
because of his rashness and hubris; others blamed the premature nature of the test flight. 
Other claims even suggested that it was Stalin himself who had ordered his death, Chkalov 
becoming too popular for his liking, but perhaps more importantly for openly voicing the 
opinion that Bukharin and Rykov should not have been found guilty at third Moscow show 
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trial.250  Whatever the reason, the death of Chkalov can be seen as a keystone moment in the 
Arctic chronicle; not only did it irritate the conquests dark backdrop, but it also marked the 
decline of the Red Arctic. The incident unleashed a full scale witch hunt in the Soviet 
aviation sphere. Key figures in the field such as aeronautical engineers V.M. Peliakov and 
V.M. Miasischev, along with N.M. Kharlamov, head of the Central Aero hydrodynamic 
Institute, were amongst those arrested.251 Despite coming at a time when the purges were 
more or less losing momentum, Chkalov’s death unleashed another wave of repression in 
the Arctic industry. If the Arctic was a mirror for the habitual, then the landscape, no matter 
how far away, was always going to fall victim to the great purges that accompanied the Stalin 
cult between 1936-1938.  
Amidst the heroic expeditions of the ‘Even Higher’ epoch, Glavsevmorput hit a string of 
crisis’ between 1936-1938. Struggling to meet the targets of the Second Five-Year Plan and 
under immense pressure from the centre, the organisation under Schmidt’s leadership sought 
to quicken progress in the region. The heightened tempos, combined with the tumultuous 
terrain and a series of logistical errors saw Glavsevmorput sustain losses of over 27 million 
rubles from river accidents alone.252 The organisations calamity, natural or otherwise, could 
not have occurred at a worse time. The purges had reached their zenith and as a result 
Glavsevmorput’s vulnerability meant that it was easy prey. The transcendent force of 
Stalinist spatial metanarrative posited that the peripheral areas were brought under control. 
This meant that for Glavsevmorput, no matter how far they operated from the centre, when 
the purges fell, “they did with sledgehammer force.”253 In synch with the dialectical nature 
of the terror, Glavsevmorput became an arena in which antipathies were settled. Engulfed 
with the typical factionalisation that overcame institutions during the purges, the senior 
highly educated personnel, most of whom had gained their credentials before the revolution, 
came into opposition with the party activists and junior scientists who swelled the 
subordinate positions in the organisation. The purges turned the inevitable logistical 
venations of operating in such a landscape into deliberate acts of espionage and sabotage. 
For every misfortune that struck Glavsevmorput, the answer was to be found in the 
unmasking of a Trotskyite. As the title in an article that appeared in Sovetstkaia Arktika in 
summer 1938 declared: “Were there really no signals warning us of the serious shortcomings 
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in our agency’s work? Without a doubt, there were signals – the anti-Soviet activities of the 
many wreckers in the ranks of GUSMP [Glasvermorput]”.254 
The terror even struck Arctic’s pantheon of heroes – at least those in its lower echelon. 
As McCannon writes, “A March 1938 document lists 299 GUSMP personnel who had 
received high honours in the previous four years; 11 had been arrested, 24 had been fired or 
demoted, and 7 had died.”255 It seemed that the abundance of middle ranking heroes buffered 
Stalin’s ‘familial’ purging. Indeed, underneath the rhetoric of heroism was a malignant 
reality, even those high-ranking heroes of the metanarrative had to treat lightly. As Mikhail 
Gromov, Hero of the Soviet Union wrote: “you were summoned to the Leader and, when 
you went, you did not know whether you were going to get a cross on your chest or a cross 
in the ground.”256 Eventually, the maelstrom of the terror began to affect Schmidt. As the 
‘gatekeeper’ of the Soviet Arctic and head of the GUSMP, Schmidt had reaped the rewards 
of the organisations success. Subsequently, when failure came forth it was he who 
shouldered maximum culpability. As accusations germinated, Schmidt appeared less 
frequently in the public eye throughout 1938. Although Russian, his Baltic-German ancestry, 
the fact that he spoke German and his many foreign contacts in Europe and America, meant 
that Schmidt fitted the profile of a saboteur perfectly.257 As Schmidt became a languished, 
beleaguered figure, long-time rival and co-worker Papanin planned a palace coup. As the 
stakes were raised, Schmidt bowed out on the 4th March 1939 with his ‘voluntary 
resignation’.  
Schmidt survived the purges. As the head of an institution struck by crisis, during a period 
when the purges were in full swing, this shows the random, chaotic nature of the purges. 
Primarily because, by whatever logic that was applied the purges, Schmidt should have fallen 
victim to the Stalinist machinery of murder: “the fact that he avoided arrest or death is 
remarkable”.258 In this anomalous episode, much can be extracted from the socialist realist 
myth-making process and the effects of its transposition from fiction to reality. Through the 
creation of the heroic metanarratives around the new Soviet idols, Stalin was creating and 
empowering genuinely popular figures, which in turn empowered him. The oscillatory 
dynamic of this power structure meant that in cases of people such as Stakhanov, Schmidt 
and Chkalov, who were integral to the metanarrative, to purge would destabilise the 
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foundation of the Stalinist myth body. As McCannon writes, “to purge a hero who was truly 
beloved by most of the entire nation and who had been built up as an embodiment of Soviet 
virtue would have been to rip the heart out of the very ideals upon which Stalinist culture 
itself was based.”259  In this case, the Arctic myth rather than being merely a product of the 
socialist realist aesthetic and world-view, in fact directly contributed to the formulation of 
the movement itself. Their synergy and tandem evolution throughout the thirties highlights 
the extent to which reality and fiction crossed over.   
As the rhetoric of the terror was taken into the lexicon of the extreme, the adventures of 
the Arctic heroes provided a common point of tangency. This unified the fantastical mantra 
of the Stalinist metanarrative by characterising heroism and malevolence with a mutual 
vivacity. The figure of the ‘wrecker’ is configured out of the same binary of equivalents as 
the superhuman power of the Arctic hero. As Groys points out, the show trials of the 1930s 
demonstrated that ostensibly normal citizens were “capable of strewing ground glass in the 
food of workers, giving them small pox and skin disease, poisoning wells and public 
places”.260 These titanically destructive feats were carried out with a similar superhuman 
energy and rhetoricised on a similar semantic plain as the Arctic heroes. Thus, the epic feats 
of the Arctic expeditions were not so much a “heroic diversion”, as many scholars have 
argued, as they were structural antithesis to the lexis of purges.261 After all, the notion of a 
‘diversion’ or ‘distraction’ would surely be too at odds with the regimes open campaign 
against ‘enemies of the people’. And although they provided a vessel of escape, Kendall 
Bailes best summates the situation, arguing, “one can be excused for interpreting these 
spectaculars as a means of diverting attention from the abuses of the regime… it would be 
folly to assert that [their] sole purpose… was to divert attention from the purges”.262  So as 
newspaper articles reported the recording breaking flights of Chkalov and company, 
unimaginable indictments and death sentences appeared next them; side by side they 
represent the antithetical synthesis inherent to Stalinism.  
Did the Arctic Myth help build support for Stalin, and in turn add to the cult? Asks John 
McCannon. “The reply is a guarded yes”.263 Without the likes of Schmidt, Papanin, Chkalov 
and Vodop’ianov, Schlögel argues that the events of 1937 would not have happened: 
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“Expeditions associated with mortal dangers became a symbolic locus of freedom in a 
country in which freedom had been abolished. The tension, nervousness and feverish 
excitement that were displayed in the rescues expressed more than simple anxiety about the 
fate of the crew”.264  Indeed, as records were crumpled, and heroic victories were celebrated, 
the murderous apparatus of Stalinism was in full swing. The anxious energy of the Arctic 
myth was compounded in the reality of the purges. The mania for flying and polar 
expeditions “was the cement that held together things that could not be united by force”.265   
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Conclusion: Empty Space, The Foundation Pit 
 
The foundation pit. A promise, a fantasy, a reality? In 1939, as the first decade of 
Stalinism came to an end, the foundation pit of the Palace of Soviets was completed. Located 
in the heart of Moscow, the excavated pit was a slightly concave concrete slab with 
concentric vertical rings, intended to carry the main hall columns. Ironically, this 
incongruous 66-foot pit was to be as tall as the ‘world’s tallest building’ would become. This 
epicentral spatial vacuum, perhaps tells us more about the psychology and function of 
Stalinist space than the structures that were built and the products that were made. This 
gigantic void embodied the paradoxical nature of Soviet space in the thirties: full and empty, 
present and absent, real and unreal. Antithetically, the performative absence of the Palace of 
Soviets made the building more present than ever in imagining of the centre. Like Stalin 
himself, the structure was omnipresent; in the lexis of socialist realism it existed between 
rhetoric and reality. The projection of the Palace conflated the language of what would be 
and what actually was. It could be seen in newspapers, magazines, scaled models, as a 
vignette or as striking outline drawing. As Schlögel writes, “the ‘tallest building of the age’ 
existed not just as a mirage, but as a definite reality”.266 In the spatial metanarrative of the 
age, this empty space was a symbol of reconciliation and solidarity that embodied that 
promise of not too distant horizon, for which the sacrifice of the thirties had worked toward. 
In reality, this giant crater reflected the unstable, chaotic temperament of Stalinism – an 
ominous void of spatial anxiety, control and terror. The paradoxical nature of foundation pit 
and the imaginary shadow it cast over the Soviet landscape, embody the very essence of the 
spatial alchemy of the Stalin cult. A phenomenon that was centred on the imagination, 
saturation and projection of space, and the synergic marriage of fantasy and reality.  
 After Stalin consolidated his power in the late 1920s, he initiated a spatial process that 
irrecoverably altered the Soviet topos. Stalin reconfigured Soviet society centripetally with 
Moscow as its axis mundi. In this spatial transformation the Soviet people reconnected with 
the sacral lineage of centralised authority. However, this reconnecting was down to more 
than an innate feeling. The concurrent epoch of the Stalin cult was not coincidental, 
throughout the 1930s Stalin’s image would become synonymous with the centre. Through 
sacral saturation of Soviet space, Stalin’s image began to transcend reality and took on a life 
of its own. As a result of this, the magnetic notion of Stalin as the heart of the Soviet Union 
was expounded through a carefully constructed body of ‘cult products’. Through socialist 
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realism, all cultural mediums became repositories of the developing state myth. In emerging 
system of meaning a dialectic pattern of spatial paradigms emerged: centre and periphery, 
spontaneity and consciousness, chosen and not chosen. These juxtaposed paradigms were 
all resolved through undergoing a ritual rite of passage to the Soviet’s centre, Moscow.  
The metanarrative actively inseminated the metaphysical reawakening of Moscow as the 
caput mundi.  Under Stalin’s ‘Socialism in One Country’ the revival of nationalism saw the 
parameters of the Third Rome myth realign accordingly with his internalising, centralising 
narrative. This reconnection with the imperial past provided Stalin with a nexus whereby he 
could justify his centralisation of space through the historical doxa of the captu mundi. As 
the terror unfolded Stalin again turned to the imperial past. Through the rehabilitation of 
Ivan the Terrible reign of terror as a progressive, modernising era, in the progressive spatial 
parallels and rhetoric of liquidating those against it – Stalin had a new narrative authority 
over the thirties. Using historical contingency as a means of positive reflection, Stalin used 
the spatial metanarrative to justify the terror and consolidate his cult through the sub-cult of 
Ivan IV. 
 As the metanarrative effaced the borders between fiction and reality, it facilitated a 
radical reorientation of social values. By verticalising social temperament an environment 
of idealism and mysticism flourished. From the centre Stalin was the advocate of these 
values – encouraging the Homo Sovietcus to defy reason and reach ‘even higher’. This 
mentality reached an apotheosis with Stalin’s conquest of the Arctic. This northern frontier 
was a figurative tabula rasa, void of any spatiotemporal lineage, Stalin used it as a spatial 
mirror. He turned nature into a battleground, with the Arctic as its greatest foe. In this 
struggle against the elements a canon of Arctic heroes led the fight. Stalin was portrayed as 
the loving father of the heroes, from his office in the Kremlin he was able to transcend the 
physical world and inspire his ‘sons’ during their expeditions. At the apex of this pantheon 
of heroes was the aviator. The aviator metanarrative developed much of the dialectic tensions 
of the myth body, the flights into the Arctic were of a highly ritual nature, configuring as a 
crucible – a trial by the elements. In the allegorical fashion of the Homeric theme of nostos 
(return home), the flights were microcosmic national epics which formed Soviet 
consciousness. In their voyage, the aviators hoped to prove their worth as a ‘son’, and in the 
subsequent tribulations they encountered the heroes’ to became heroic. On their return from 
the depths of the periphery the pilots brought the metanarrative full circle – from centre to 
periphery and back again. Awaiting them in Moscow would be Stalin; as McCannon points 
out the Stalin cult was inextricably linked with the Arctic heroes. In the Arctic myth, Stalin 
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used the reflective landscape to place himself at the epicentre of the developing cultural of 
heroism. Despite being so far from the centre, the Arctic and its canon of heroes did not 
escape the frantic chaos of the terror. The transcendent reach of the Stalinist spatial 
metanarrative posited that the peripheral areas were brought under control. This meant that 
for Arctic institutions, no matter how far they operated from the centre, the purges still 
devastated them.  
In trying to explain how the Stalin cosmology came to be, I focused my lens on the 
cultural topography of the 1930s. Beneath all the cult products were complex spatial 
dialectics that were carefully elucidated by the cult producers. In the 1930s, this 
metanarrative blurred the boundaries of the real: fiction became reality; reality became 
fiction. The result was a landscape of thought which was regulated by a repository of myth. 
All cultural space was saturated with the metanarrative and in the developing cosmos of 
Stalinism, a new semantic ordering of space emerged. By deconstructing this space and 
demystifying the cultic products that gave it meaning, I sought to highlight the spatial 
metanarrative as one of the key explanations for the facilitation of the Stalin cult. In doing 
so, the landscape of cult at once emerged and remerged as a synchronous history of objects, 
spaces, symbols and meanings. In the process of deconstructing and reconstructing these 
elements, the cosmology of the cult can be understood as an alchemy of time, space, culture, 
terror, and emotion. I have shown how these elements all combined to create a spatial 
metanarrative that amounted to more than the sum of its parts; that amounted to the Stalin 
cult. And yet, this surplus, Stalin’s elevation, his larger than life (omni)presence, is in many 
ways where the explanation ends. A woman who faints when she mistakes Stalin for a 
floating portrait; a group of Soviet World War II veterans who had to turn a poster of Stalin 
to face the wall in order to feel free enough to talk openly; citizens who reacted so intensely 
to the death of Stalin that they suffered heart attacks.267 This surplus is of a different order – 
one which is beyond the fathom of study. 
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Epilogue: The Spectre of Stalin  
‘Who’s there?’ 
 ‘Old age my name. 
 I’ve come to you coming for you.’ 
 
‘Not now. 
Occupied . 
I’ve got things to do.’ 
 
I wrote 
Made calls 
I ate scrambled eggs. 
 
Went to the door,  
but no one was around. 
Was it my friends making fun of me? 
Or maybe it was I, misheard the name? 
 
Not age, 
maturity alone was here, 
And could not wait,  
and sighed, 
then went away?! 
– A Knock on the Door, Yevgeny Yevtushenko 
 
You reach a moment in life when, among the people you have known, the dead outnumber the 
living. And the mind refuses to accept more faces, more expressions: on every new face you 
encounter, it prints the old forms. 
     – Invisible Cities, Italo Calvino 
Sometimes. In extraordinary situations…In a destroyed city…. I can’t find a way out, and I 
meet him [Stalin]. In very strange confusing dreams.268  
             – Molotov Remembers, Vyacheslav Molotov   
 
On the 5 March 1953, Stalin died one real and several symbolic deaths.269 With so much 
meaning attached to him, would his death mark the end of the culture of veneration? In the 
initial period after his passing it seemed that the Soviet Union underwent something of an 
existential crisis, the cosmos of meaning that Stalin left in his wake collapsed without him 
as the centripetal force. With the sudden loss of spatiotemporal identity, Khrushchev decided 
to derail the legacy of the Stalin cult in his 1956 secret speech. This catalysed an 
unprecedented iconoclastic campaign that attempted to remove all traces of Stalin from the 
Soviet topos, with the policy of de-Stalinization officially advocating the destruction of all 
products of the Stalin cult. Iconoclastic initiatives were taken from above and below: from 
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(Chicago:  Ivan  R.  Dee,  1993),  198.  
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the state sponsored policy to simple telling of an anti-Stalin joke. Whilst some participated 
in the destruction of the symbols, others were more cautious  and questioned the legitimacy 
of this radical course of action.270 In the years that followed Stalin’s physical image was 
regularly defaced or removed from Soviet space. And yet, it seems that this iconoclasm 
worked only as a temporary anaesthetic; not much closure was to be found in these efforts. 
“Stalin had to die again and again”, writes Plamper, and yet, despite these recurring cycles 
of death, the spectre of Stalin lives on more than ever in modern day Russia. Indeed, over 
the past 10 years, public images of Stalin have gradually been re-emerging. As he does so, 
one thing is clear: in the dreams, nightmares, memories and emotions of Russia, looms the 
notion of Stalin. Through his real and rhetorical saturation of space, Stalin became much 
more than a political leader. Because the spatial metanarrative of the cult was underpinned 
by its synergic fusion of fantasy and reality, when Stalin died in the real world, this death 
was only partial. Indeed, he has continued to live on in the mental universe of which he was 
the architect. Ironically there is substance in the hollow platitude; “Stalin will live eternally!”  
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